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Enrollment, Labor, And Effort: An Analysis Of The Educational Choices Of
Students In Mexico
Abstract
This thesis consists of two chapters and examines questions centered around the educational choices of
students in Mexico.
When school-age children work, their education competes for their time and effort, which may lead to
lower educational attainment and academic achievement. Chapter 1 develops and estimates a model of
student achievement in Mexico, in which students make decisions on school enrollment, study effort and
labor supply, taking into account local schooling options and wages. These decisions affect their
academic achievement in math and Spanish, which is modeled using a value-added framework. The
model is a random utility model over discrete school-work alternatives, where study effort is the outcome
of an optimization problem under each alternatives. The model is estimated using an administrative test
score database on Mexican 6th grade students combined with survey data on students, parents and
schools, geocode data on school locations, and wage data from the Mexican census. The empirical
results show that if students were prohibited from working while in school, the national dropout rate
would increase by approximately 20%, while achievement would increase in math and Spanish. Expanding
the conditional cash transfer, either in the magnitude of the benefits or the coverage, in conjunction with
prohibiting working while in school is an operational policy that would greatly reduce dropout while
maintaining the achievement gains.
In Chapter 2, my coauthor Emilio Borghesan and I analyze a large-scale and long-running distance
education program in Mexico. We use an empirical framework that combines value-added modeling with
a sample selection model to estimate Marginal Treatment Effects (MTEs) for learning in telesecundarias
relative to traditional secondary schools. The estimated MTEs reveal that school choice is not random,
and that the effect of telesecundaria attendance is positive for nearly everyone. Using performance on
nationally standardized exams as a measure of knowledge, we find that the average student experiences
a 0.34 standard deviation improvement in math and a 0.21 standard deviation improvement in Spanish
after one year of attending a telesecundaria. We conclude by estimating the effects of counterfactual
policies that expand telesecundaria availability and find that they generate improvements in academic
performance.
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ABSTRACT
ENROLLMENT, LABOR, AND EFFORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
EDUCATIONAL CHOICES OF STUDENTS IN MEXICO
Gabrielle Vasey
Petra E. Todd
This thesis consists of two chapters and examines questions centered around the
educational choices of students in Mexico.
When school-age children work, their education competes for their time and effort,
which may lead to lower educational attainment and academic achievement. Chapter 1 develops and estimates a model of student achievement in Mexico, in which
students make decisions on school enrollment, study effort and labor supply, taking
into account local schooling options and wages. These decisions affect their academic
achievement in math and Spanish, which is modeled using a value-added framework.
The model is a random utility model over discrete school-work alternatives, where
study effort is the outcome of an optimization problem under each alternatives. The
model is estimated using an administrative test score database on Mexican 6th grade
students combined with survey data on students, parents and schools, geocode data
on school locations, and wage data from the Mexican census. The empirical results show that if students were prohibited from working while in school, the national
dropout rate would increase by approximately 20%, while achievement would increase
in math and Spanish. Expanding the conditional cash transfer, either in the magnitude of the benefits or the coverage, in conjunction with prohibiting working while in
school is an operational policy that would greatly reduce dropout while maintaining
iv

the achievement gains.
In Chapter 2, my coauthor Emilio Borghesan and I analyze a large-scale and longrunning distance education program in Mexico. We use an empirical framework that
combines value-added modeling with a sample selection model to estimate Marginal
Treatment Effects (MTEs) for learning in telesecundarias relative to traditional secondary schools. The estimated MTEs reveal that school choice is not random, and
that the effect of telesecundaria attendance is positive for nearly everyone. Using
performance on nationally standardized exams as a measure of knowledge, we find
that the average student experiences a 0.34 standard deviation improvement in math
and a 0.21 standard deviation improvement in Spanish after one year of attending
a telesecundaria. We conclude by estimating the effects of counterfactual policies
that expand telesecundaria availability and find that they generate improvements in
academic performance.
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CHAPTER 1 : The Impact of Child Labor on Student Enrollment,
Effort and Achievement: Evidence from Mexico
1.1. Introduction
When children participate in the labor force, it is often at the expense of their education. Globally, the International Labour Organization estimated that 144 million
children under the age of 14 were working in 2012. The trade-off between working,
with the benefits of receiving a wage or helping family, and attending school, in the
hope of increasing future wages, is one that many children and families face worldwide.
Children who attend school may also work part time and face another choice with
respect to the amount of time and effort to dedicate to studying compared to working.
Often, laws prohibiting child labor and requiring school enrollment exist, but they
are not well enforced. Family socioeconomic status, school availability, school quality, ability and earnings opportunities all influence children’s time allocation decisions
and their resulting academic achievement and attainment.
This paper explores the relationship between child labor, school enrollment and academic achievement in Mexico, and analyzes the impacts of enforcing policies related
to labor and education laws. I consider children who graduated from primary school
(Grade 6) and who should be enrolling in middle school (Grade 7). Mexican Basic
Education, defined as Grades 1 through 9, is compulsory and labor of minors under
the age of 14 is legally prohibited. However, in the 2010 Census, 7.9% of children
aged 12 and 13 report not enrolling in school. A nationally representative survey in
2009 found that 25.7% of Grade 7 students who are in school report working at least
one day a week. Many developing countries around the world face similar struggles
to keep children in school and out of the labor force.
1

My analysis includes not only the students who go to school full time or work full
time, but also the students who combine school and work and the repercussions that
working has on their academic achievement. Incorporating this more nuanced choice
set is ideal, however this is one of the few empirical studies that includes these choices,
which highlights how challenging it is to acquire the required data and setting. The
existing studies that do allow for students to combine work and school do not consider
the how this impacts academic achievement (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite, 2003;
Leite, Narayan, and Skoufias, 2015). I use individual-level data on school enrollment,
test scores, demographics, labor choices, and effort choices to identify the parameters
that define the tradeoffs that students are facing.
To study the determinants of children’s time allocation decisions, I develop and estimate a model of school and labor participation decisions with endogenous school
effort choices. In my model, individuals who finish primary school have a choice set
of middle schools available. The choice set is determined using data on school locations and prior-year school attendance patterns. The middle schools are treated as
differentiated products that vary in terms of school infrastructure and principal characteristics such as experience, as well as the type of school curriculum. The choice
of school affects a student’s utility directly, as well as their achievement production
function and marginal cost of effort. Effort is costly, and the marginal cost of effort
depends on student characteristics and on whether the student is working. Wage
offers vary by student demographics and by primary school location and there are
separate wage offers for working full time and working while enrolled in school.
To estimate my model, I combine several data sources: administrative data on nationwide standardized tests in math and Spanish, survey data from students, parents and
principals, geocode data on school locations, and Mexican census data on local labor
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market wages and hours worked. Combined, these data sources create an incredibly rich dataset that has not been used by any studies to date. The administrative
data tracks all students in Mexico as they complete national standardized tests and
includes information on which students are beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer Prospera. The data has been used by several recent studies to analyze the impact
of Prospera on achievement (Acevedo, Ortega, and Székely, 2019; Behrman, Parker,
and Todd, 2020).
In the model, students decide whether to attend school, and if they attend, they
also decide what type of school to attend and how much effort to dedicate to their
studies. The marginal cost of effort varies by age, gender, parental education, lagged
test scores, and working status. I use the model’s first-order conditions to solve for
an optimal effort level that is specific to each type of school. The data provide five
measures of self-reported effort, which I use within a factor model to obtain a single
effort index.
The model is a discrete-continuous choice model with partially latent continuous
choice variables (Dubin and McFadden, 1984). Specifically, it is a random utility
model over discrete school-work alternatives, where study effort is determined as
the outcome of an optimization problem under each of the school-work alternatives.
Achievement is modeled using value-added equations that incorporate student’s effort
choices. I estimate the model via Maximum Likelihood, where the probability can
be decomposed into three conditional probabilities, which each have a closed-form
solution.
The identification of the parameters of interest relies mainly on geographic variation
of exogenous market conditions and choice sets. To identify the value of school, I
use variation in the distances required to travel to school and to identify the value of
3

working, I use variation in local wage offers. Effort is a key mechanism in the model,
and the parameters related to the cost and productivity of effort are identified using
self-reported effort measures from students.
I find that traveling to a middle school is costly and that students value distance
education schools (Telesecundarias) less than the other two school types (General and
Technical). Students value schools with high average expected test scores, however
the amount of weight they put on that component does not depend on their parents
education levels or on whether they are conditional cash transfer beneficiaries. Effort
is costly to students, especially when working, but less so for female students and for
students with higher lagged test scores. Students are estimated to dislike working
while in school overall. Effort is estimated to be an important input into both math
and Spanish test score production functions.
I use the estimated model to evaluate how education and work-related policy changes
would affect school enrollment, academic achievement, and children’s labor-force participation rate. First, I use the model to simulate the effects of a partial labor law
enforcement that removes the labor option for children who are enrolled in school.
These estimates provide insight into what fraction of students only attend school if
they can also work and how much achievement would increase if students did not
divide their time between work and school. The second and third counterfactuals
consider policies that would work in conjunction with the first, with the goal of reducing the drop out rate. The second counterfactual considers prohibiting all child
labor and the third considers expanding the conditional cash transfer for school attendance, both in terms of benefits amounts and program coverage.
The results of the counterfactual analysis show that almost 10% of students who are
working while enrolled in school would drop out if they were unable to combine work
4

and school. This increases the national dropout rate by almost 20%. For students who
remain enrolled, their effort increases by approximately 3% of a standard deviation,
resulting in increases in their math and Spanish scores by an average of 3% of a
standard deviation. Prohibiting all child labor results in a dropout rate lower than
under the benchmark model. However, a similarly low dropout rate can be achieved
by either increasing the conditional cash transfer amounts, or expanding the set of
families who receive the conditional cash transfer to include more of those with low
monthly incomes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lists related literature and the contribution of this paper. Section 3 describes the dataset and setting and provides summary
statistics for the variables of interest. Section 4 describes the model of discrete schoolwork alternatives with endogenous effort choice. Section 5 describes the estimation
strategy and Section 6 discusses the results from the estimation. Section 7 discusses
the policy implications and Section 8 concludes.

1.2. Literature
Recently, there have been several papers estimating models of school choice, where
schools with differing characteristics are treated as differentiated products (Ferreyra,
2007; Epple, Jha, and Sieg, 2018; Neilson, 2014; Bau, 2019; Neilson, Allende, and
Gallego, 2019). These models are similar to mine in that they include school characteristics and a student achievement production function, and the authors use the
model to evaluate how policy changes impact school choices. I extend these frameworks by allowing for dropping out of school and part-time or full-time work. I also
incorporate students’ decisions of how much effort to devote to their studies. These
extensions are necessary to make the school choice model relevant to developing coun-
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try contexts where child labor is prevalent.
A large portion of the literature examining the relationship between child labor and
education considers how policies, such as conditional cash transfers, affect school enrollment and child labor.1 Dynamic models have been used to evaluate the long-term
effect of such policies, however none thus far has incorporated test score production
functions, time allocation decisions, and decisions about what type of school to attend
(Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago, 2011). There also exist
some static choice models that include the options of dropping out, enrolling and
working part time, or only enrolling (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite, 2003; Leite,
Narayan, and Skoufias, 2015). However, these models also do not examine academic
achievement or how working part time affects a child’s ability to study. Finally, there
are some recent papers that consider the impact of labor on achievement, without
incorporating school choice and enrollment decisions. Keane, Krutikova, and Neal
(2018) consider many possible uses of time for students, and find that working is only
harmful to achievement if it is taking away from study time.
Although there is a substantial literature in the education economics field studying
teacher effort, how it affects student achievement and how it is influenced by incentive
pay, there is relatively little focus on student effort, which is an important input in
academic achievement. A study using an instrumental variables approach finds that
school attendance has a positive causal impact on achievement for elementary- and
middle-school students (Gottfried, 2010). A causal relationship between study time
and grades has also been found for college students (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2008). There are very few papers that model student effort in a structural way, and
1
There exists a related literature studying the effects of working in highschool or college, and the
effects of this on educational outcomes and human capital accumulation (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2003; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Buscha, Maurel, Page, and Speckesser, 2012; Le Barbanchon, Ubfal, and Araya, 2020).

6

estimate how it affects learning. Todd and Wolpin (2018) develop and estimate a
strategic model of student and teacher efforts within a classroom setting.
The literature on CCT programs, and specifically on the Prospera program, is extensive. The program began in 1997, and since then over 100 papers have been written
about it (Parker and Todd, 2017). The majority of these papers use the experimental
data gathered during the first two years of the program. There is a consensus in the
literature that Prospera increases enrollment in school for students in junior and senior
high school (Schultz, 2004; Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd, 2005; Attanasio, Meghir,
and Santiago, 2011; Dubois, De Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2012). However, studies focused on student enrollment and grade progression and not on student achievement,
with the exception of two recent working papers (Acevedo, Ortega, and Székely, 2019;
Behrman, Parker, and Todd, 2020).2 Finally, there are a few studies using experimental data to estimate the impact of conditional cash transfers on child labor decisions.
For example, Yap, Sedlacek, and Orazem (2009) find that the PETI program in Brazil
increased academic performance and decreased child labor for beneficiary households.

1.3. Data and Setting
The data requirements for answering research questions related to child labor, school
enrollment and academic achievement are high. Among other variables, the labor
choice, school choice and achievement realization for each student must be observed.
The data set that I use provides the above mentioned variables and more. In addition,
there is quasi-random variation, since each primary school has a different choice set
of middle schools, as well as a different labor market conditions. Unfortunately, there
are some variables that are not available in this setting, most notably information on
2

These papers use matching and regression-based treatment effect estimators.
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parental wages. The absence of these data will inform the modeling choices that I
make in the next section.
Not only does the data set provide the majority of the required variables, but Mexico
as a country is an ideal setting to study this question. In 2010, the year analyzed
in this paper, Mexico had Education Regulation that defined Grades 1 through 9 as
compulsory, and Labor Regulation that prohibited labor of minors under the age of
14. However, 7.9% of children age 12 and 13 reported not being enrolled in school in
the 2010 Census. Further, over a quarter of students in Grade 7 reported working at
least one day a week in a national survey. In addition, increasing student enrollment
has been a target for the Mexican government for decades, with programs such as the
conditional cash transfer and the distance education schools. These ensure that the
majority of students, even in rural areas, have access to a local school if they choose
to enroll.

1.3.1. Data Sources
To carry out this research, I use a newly available merged dataset. This dataset
is comprised of several components which come from two main sources. The first
component is the Evaluación National de Logro Académico en Centros Escolares or
ENLACE test scores. These tests were administered at the end of the school year
to gather information on students’ achievement in math and Spanish. They were
given to students every year between the 2006/2007 school year and the 2013/2014
school year. The Mexican Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) was in charge of
administering the test. The second component comes from the same source as the
ENLACE test scores, and can be easily merged with the test score data. Every year
a group of schools was randomly selected and all students enrolled in those schools
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were given a questionnaire. These data have recently been used for impact evaluation
studies of the Prospera program (Acevedo et al., 2019; Behrman et al., 2020). The
third component of the data set is comprised of a list of all schools in Mexico, and can
be merged with the above data to provide the geographical location of the schools.
The test score data provides important information regarding student achievement,
however whether a student took the test or not may not always be an accurate
method of recording school attendance. It is possible that a student who is enrolled
and attending school does not write the ENLACE test for several reasons. To ensure
that these students are recorded as enrolled, even without a test score, I merge the
National Student Registry (Registro Nacional de Alumnos) with the test score data.
This provides information on enrollment for all students in the country.
Finally, the model requires data on wages, which are not recorded in the previously
mentioned source. The 2010 Census is used to access information on children between
the ages of 12 and 20, and their working status and wages. The Census also contains
other personal information on the students such as their age, gender, school attendance history, parental education, living situation, and the municipality in which they
reside.
Combining all of the data from the above sources, yields an incredibly rich representative sample of students across Mexico. For each student, I have their national
standardized test scores, their school IDs (with associated school information), individual demographics, household demographics (including conditional cash transfer
status), and the average municipal wage conditional on age, gender, family background and school attendance.
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1.3.2. Estimation Sample
The analysis in this paper focuses on students across Mexico in Grade 6 in 2008 who
progress to Grade 7 in 2009.3 The sample can be divided into two groups: those
who enrolled in school in Grade 7, and those who dropped out of school after Grade
6.4 There are 229,199 students enrolled in Grade 6 in 2008 for whom I have survey
answers from themselves and their parents. Of these students, 17,195, or 7.5% do not
appear in either the ENLACE data or the Roster data in any of the next four years.
I assume that these students have dropped out of school.
In Grade 7 in 2009, there are 107,898 students for whom we have survey answers
from themselves and their parents.5 The mean age of the students in Grade 7 is 13,
and a bar graph showing the distribution of ages is shown in Figure 1. The sample is
approximately equal in terms of gender, as 49.9% of the students are female. 26.1%
of students are beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer Prospera.

1.3.3. Key Variables
Test Scores
Standardized test scores in math and Spanish are used as a measure of student
achievement. The test administrators (SEP) standardized the tests in the base year,
2008, to have a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. The same transformation was used in subsequent years.6 All students write the test in Grade 6 and Grade
3

There are three states (out of 32) that are not included in the analysis. The states of Guerrero,
Michoacán, and Oaxaca had many schools for which there were no ENLACE scores submitted. To
prevent bias in the analysis, students in these states were not included.
4
See Appendix A.4 for more details on how the sample for estimating the discrete choice model
is constructed.
5
Each year a different sample of schools is given the questionnaire, so the majority of these
students are not in the sample of Grade 6 students from the previous year. Sample size also changes
from year to year.
6
This is not equivalent to standardizing the scores each year, as is apparent from the means
presented.
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7, so it is possible to see how they change relative to students in the same grade from
their baseline results. Table 1 shows the mean and the standard deviation of Grade
6 and 7 test scores in math and Spanish. To compute these statistics, the cohort of
Grade 7 students was used.

Labor Decision
To observe the labor decision of the students, I use a question from the student survey
which asks: “On average, how many days a week do you work?”. Figure 2 shows the
responses, divided by gender. Boys work more than girls, and the majority of students
are not working. The mean number of days a week worked for the whole sample is
0.83. However for children 13 and younger the mean is 0.80, and for children 14 and
older the mean is 1.68, so older children are working substantially more than the
younger children.
Although I will not be considering different occupation types in this project, it is
of interest to know what kinds of labor children were engaging in during this time
period in Mexico. From the Census, the most common occupation type for 12 year
olds was agriculture (maize, beans, livestock, flowers, vegetables, fruits) with the next
most common being a sales worker or working in a store. Other occupations reported
included street vendors, food preparation and a support worker for construction. In
the student survey, there is a question inquiring about the reasons for working, and
59% of students reported working for their family.

Student Effort
Achieving a high test score and earning a wage at a job both take time and energy.
To capture this, and to understand how combining school and work may impact
11

achievement, I incorporate effort into my analysis. The rich data set provides five
self-reported measures related to effort. The questions are:
1. On average, how many hours a day do you spend studying or doing homework
outside of school hours? Options: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 hours.
2. How often do you pay attention in your classes at school? Options: never,
almost never, sometimes, almost always, always.
3. How often do you participate in your classes at school? Options: never, almost
never, sometimes, almost always, always.
4. How often do you miss school? Options: never, almost never, sometimes, almost
always, always.
5. How often do you skip your classes when you’re at school? Options: never,
almost never, sometimes, almost always, always.
The first measure, the number of hours studied per day, is cardinal. The other four
measures are ordinal variables, as they are answered on a Likert scale. To combine
them into one value, I use factor analysis. This analysis is done outside of the model
estimation, and uses polychoric correlations to take into account the ordinal variables.
I then compute the eigenvalue decomposition of the correlation matrix, and estimate
loadings for each of the five variables. The end result is a single value of effort for
each student, ẽM
ijL , which combines the information from the student’s responses to
the five effort questions. Figure 3 presents a histogram of the new continuous effort
variable. The effort values are almost all positive and the distribution appears to be
approximately normal.7 Estimation details and results are in Appendix A.2.
7

Negative values of effort are possible, though rare, since the last two effort questions have
negative loading factors.
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Wages
It is necessary to know what wage each of the children could be earning if they decided
to work. Unfortunately, wages are not included in the survey data, so I impute wages
for all students using census data. The census contains the working status, enrollment
status, and the wages earned for children across Mexico. Other important information
such as the age and gender of the child, the education level of their parents, and the
municipality in which they live is also recorded.
To account for non-random selection into working, a Heckman selection model is estimated. Two separate equations are estimated, the first with the outcome variable
being hourly wages, and the second with the outcome variable being number of hours
worked per week. Variables representing family socioeconomic levels, such as family
income and home infrastructure are used as instruments that affect selection into
working, but do not affect the wage offers directly. Regressions are estimated separately for girls and boys. For details on the wage estimation and parameter estimates,
see Appendix A.6.

wigj = γ0 + γ1 ai + γ2 1{j 6= 0} +γ3 ai × 1{j 6= 0} + γ4 M omEduci + γ5 DadEduci
|
{z
}
|{z} | {z }
Age

Parental education

Not enrolled

+ γ6 ai × M omEduci + γ7 ai × DadEduci +

Geog
| {z }

+νigj

Municipality FE

To compute the monthly wage for each student, their hourly wage is multiplied by
their weekly hours, and then by four. The imputed monthly wages will be used for
the remainder of this paper. Table 2 contains results from the imputations. The
results are divided by gender of the child, and by the school enrollment status. The
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mean and standard deviation are shown for the hourly wages, the number of hours
worked per week, and the monthly wage. The monetary values are in 2010 pesos. For
students working full time, the imputed wages for females is 14.2 pesos per hour and
for males it is 14.1 pesos per hour. The part time wages for students who are also
enrolled in school are slightly lower. During this time period, the minimum wage was
15 pesos per hour, and the results are just below this value, which is feasible given
that these were informal jobs. Students working while enrolled in school worked on
average 19 hours a week, while those who are working full time work just under 40
hours a week.

School Types
There are four different types of middle schools in Mexico: General, Technical, Telesecundarias, and Private. Technical middle schools have a focus on vocational studies.
Telesecundarias, which are wide spread and well established in Mexico, are predominately located in rural areas and offer instruction through video sessions at local
centers. The purpose of these schools are to provide access to education for students in rural areas without having to incur the cost of hiring teachers specializing in
each subject. Private schools are almost exclusively in urban areas, and have tuition
payments. Unfortunately, I was not able to collect information on school tuition, so
students attending private schools are not included in the estimation of the model.
Table 3 contains summary statistics for the four different types of schools in Mexico.
From the table it is apparent that there are many small telesecundarias, predominately in rural areas. The class size of telesecundarias is also noticeably smaller than
both General and Technical schools. Although all schools have a fairly equal amount
of female and male students, the proportion of students who are beneficiaries of the
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conditional cash transfer differs drastically by school type. The majority of students
enrolled in a telesecundaria are beneficiaries, while less than 15% of those in General
schools are. Finally, by dropping all Private schools, only 8% of students are removed
from the sample.

Distances and Choice Sets
The location of each school in the data set is known. With these locations, it is
possible to compute the distance between a student’s primary school and middle
school, and analyze how far students are traveling. Further, it is possible to see what
other options were available within a certain distance. Examining the data, it is
apparent that middle schools are much more sparse than primary schools, especially
in rural regions of Mexico. Figure 4 shows the geographic distribution of primary
and middle schools in a region in Mexico. Although there is a small city in the top
right corner, the remainder of area covered by the map is rural. Depending on which
primary school a student attended, there may be a middle school at the same location,
or the nearest one may be several kilometers away.
Unfortunately the home address of students is not included in the data. Given the
broad coverage of primary schools, I am assuming that students attend a primary
school close to their home, and therefore their primary school address is an adequate
proxy for their home address. To calculate distance, a straight line is measured
between the primary school and the middle school, as shown in Figure 5. It is also
possible to calculate distance using roads and paths on Google Maps, but this does
not capture many of the rural pathways.
For the estimation, I have to define which middle schools each student considers when
making their school choice. To do this, I create a circle around the primary school
15

and consider all middle schools within the circle to be in the choice set, as shown
in Figure 5. However, choosing the same radius for all primary schools would not
account for regional topography or the local availability of schools. Therefore, each
primary school has a custom radius that is computed by analyzing how far students
from that primary school traveled on average to attend middle school in previous
years.8

1.3.4. Data Patterns
To quantify the impact of enforcing child labor laws on educational attainment and
achievement, it is crucial to understand the relationships between working, study
effort, achievement, and the many other inputs from the setting. The following subsections describe these patterns and correlations in the data. This is helpful in understanding the research question, and also informative for modelling. Finally, the
estimated model should be able to reproduce these patterns and correlations, which
is confirmed in the Results section.

Working and Achievement
When discussing working while in school, a main concern is that the test scores of
students who are working could suffer. The simple regression shown in Table 4 does
show a significant negative relationship between working and Grade 7 test scores.
The covariate “Working” is a dummy variable, and in column (1) it is equal to 1 for
all students who report working at least 1 day a week, in column (2) it is 1 for all
students who report working at least 2 days a week, and so on. This is a descriptive
regression, so the results should not be interpreted as causal, however it does control
8

Distances are capped at 15km to get rid of outliers and students who moved. Students who
changed state are also removed from the estimation sample.
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for the student’s lagged test scores, their gender and age, their parental education
levels, and whether they are a beneficiary of the conditional cash transfer. The magnitude of the relationship increases as the number of days a week working increases.
Students who work at least 3 days a week are found to have 5% of a standard deviation lower test scores than their peers. This magnitude is equivalent to the increase
in test scores that students have if their mother has at least a middle school education.

Working and Study Effort
Although the relationship between working and achievement can be studied directly,
it is more informative to investigate the underlying mechanisms. The main mechanism that comes to mind that connects both work and academic achievement is time
and energy. For this project, I will bundle them together, and call the overall measure study effort (the variable is described in detail in Section 1.3.3). If students are
working, they have another use of their time. Table 5 shows that there is a negative
correlation between working at least one day a week and the effort variable. The correlation decreases in magnitude as more controls are added, however the significance
remains. In the final column, students who work at least one day a week have 5% of
a standard deviation lower effort values than students who are not working.

Study Effort and Achievement
For study effort to be a valid mechanism between working and achievement, there
must also be a correlation between effort and achievement in the data. Figure 6 shows
that higher test scores in both math and Spanish are correlated with higher values of
effort (without controlling for any covariates). While controlling for variables, such
as lagged test scores and parental education, does decrease the magnitude of the re-
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lationship, Table 6 shows that the significant positive relationship still exists. These
results also provide evidence that the effort measure created in this paper is picking
up an important input into test scores, and that this input is not captured by lagged
test scores and other demographic variables.

School Accessibility and Enrollment
When deciding whether to enroll in school or not, students take into consideration
both the availability of schools and their outside option of working. The farther away
a middle school is from their primary school, the higher the cost of traveling there.
Figure 7 shows that students who have no schools in their area are more likely to
drop out than the students who have middle schools nearby.

Wages and Working
The imputed wages depend not only on student characteristics, but also based on the
municipality in which the student resides. This provides geographic heterogeneity
in the wages. However, this geographic variation is not useful if it is not correlated
with the choices that students are making. Table 7 contains estimates from a linear
probability regression, where the observations are at the municipality level. For each
municipality, the average monthly wage is calculated, as well as the average lagged
test scores, the average parental education level, and the mean proportion of students
receiving the conditional cash transfer. Wages are normalized in this regression so
that a standard deviation is equal to 1. The results show that increasing the mean
wage by one standard deviation is correlated with an increase of almost 1 percentage
point in the dropout rate of the municipality. This is very significant given that the
national average dropout rate is less than 8%.
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1.4. Model
The model captures the different choices that students make as they progress from
primary school (Grade 6) to middle school (Grade 7). They choose what school, if
any, they wish to attend. Based on the location of the primary school that student
i attended (Pi ), the student will have a choice set of available middle schools, SPi .
Middle schools are categorized into three types: General, Technical (vocational) and
telesecundarias (distance education). Students also make a labor choice. If the student chooses not to enroll in school, it is assumed that they work full time. Students
who choose to enroll in school may choose between working part time or focusing
only on their studies. Students receive wage offers that depend on their age, gender, parental education, location and whether they are enrolled in school. Finally,
students who enroll in school make an effort choice. Effort is costly, however it is
an input into the achievement production function and students’ utility depends on
achievement.
Each student who finished Grade 6 enters the model with a set of initial conditions.
These include their gender, their age, their lagged test scores and if they are a beneficiary of Prospera, the conditional cash transfer program. Also included are permanent
family characteristics including the number of siblings, the parental education levels,
the monthly family income, and some information about the household, such as if
they own a computer. Finally, the geographic location of the primary school is included, which gives information on whether the neighbourhood is rural or urban, and
also identifies the choice set of middle schools.

19

1.4.1. Student Utility
Students in the model are 12 years old on average, and therefore it is plausible that
they are making their schooling choice along with their family.9 Families care about
student achievement, monetary compensation coming from Prospera or wages, the
type of school the student attends, the cost of traveling to school, and the cost of
effort. Effort may be more costly if the student has other demands on their time,
such as a part time job, or if they have lower lagged test scores. The utility of student
i attending school j with labor choice L is given by

UijL (eijL ) = CCTi + 1{L = P T }wiP T + α1 dPi j + α2 d2Pi j +
{z
} |
|
{z
}
Monetary Compensation

Distance Traveled

(α3 + α4 P Educi + α5 1{CCT > 0})
|
{z



Â7,S
ij (eijL )
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ij (eijL )
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}
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}

School Types

(αi,9 + 1{L = P T }α10 ) eijL + α11 e2ijL + νijL
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The monetary compensation includes the conditional cash transfer CCTi , which student i receives if they are a Prospera beneficiary, as well as a part-time wage wiP T ,
which they receive if they choose to work part time. The coefficient on the monetary
component is constrained to one, so that the units of the remaining utility coefficients
are in terms of money (pesos). The distance between student i’s primary school Pi ,
and middle school j is given by dPi j . Achievement in Spanish and math, Â7,S
ij (eijL )
9

In the ideal scenario a family budget constraint would be included. Unfortunately, although the
survey does contain a question on family income, the responses are in very coarse bins, and are not
fine enough to include in a budget constraint. In the results section, I discuss how not including a
budget constraint could bias the results.
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and Â7,M
ij (eijL ), depend on student characteristics, middle-school characteristics, and
students’ effort choices eijL . Students may care differently about their scores depending on their parent’s education, P Educi and if they are a conditional cash transfer
beneficiary. To capture parental education, P Educi is equal to one if both parents
have at least a middle-school education. Students receive a benefit from enrolling in
school, which is captured by α6 , and this benefit may vary depending on parental
education. T ypej is school j’s type, and can be one of telesecundaria, Technical or
General. Students potential distaste for working while in school is captured by the
coefficient α8 .
A linear and quadratic term for effort are included in the student utility. This allows
for flexibility and also ensures a solution for the optimal effort for each student. The
random coefficient αi,5 captures heterogeneity in the marginal cost of effort across
students. The coefficient can be broken down into a component that is constant
across students, a component that varies with student characteristics, and a random
unobserved component,
αi,9 = α9 + λXi + ηi
where ηi ∼ N (0, ση2 ). Student characteristics contained in Xi include the students’
gender, their parental education, and their lagged test scores.
If students choose the outside option, they are choosing to drop out of school after
6th grade. It is assumed that they work full time, and receive a full time wage wiF T .
Ui0 = wiF T + νi0

The error terms are assumed to be iid type I extreme value, so the overall framework
is a mixed logit model. The wages, wiP T and wiF T are estimated using Mexican Census
21

data as described below.
Student i’s choice set of middle schools, SPi , is comprised of all middle schools within
a certain distance of their primary school, Pi . This distance is computed by considering how far students have historically traveled from this primary school. Because
of this, some choice sets cover smaller areas than others. Each school in the choice
set is defined by the distance between it and student i’s primary school, dPi j , and
the type of school it is, T ypej . Other school-level variables from the principal survey
that I include in the analysis relate to infrastructure and principal and teacher quality.

1.4.2. Wage Offers
Each student receives a full-time and a part-time wage offer. If they accept the full
time wage, they are not able to enroll in school. They can also choose to not accept
either offer and only enroll in school. Potential hourly wages for children are imputed
using Census data (details are in Section 1.3.3). Wages are allowed to depend on
age, gender, school attendance, parental education, and geographic location (either
urban/rural and municipality).

1.4.3. Expected Test Scores
For students who choose to enroll in school, their test scores are generated by a
value-added production function. The student inputs to the production function
include lagged test scores, student characteristics (including age, gender, and family
characteristics) and their effort choices. School inputs, Zj , include the type of school,
principal education and experience, if the school has internet, if the school teaching
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materials are sufficient, and how the principal rates the teachers.

T
T 6,M
Â7,T
+ δ T A6,S + δ T eijL +
ij (eijL ) = δ0 + δ1 Ai
|
{z 2 i } |3 {z }
Lagged Scores

Effort

δ4T Xi
| {z }

+

Student chara.

δ5T Zj
| {z }

School chara.

T
for T ∈ {S, M } (1.1)
+ δ6T eijL Zj + ξije

The last term, eijL Zj , is an interaction between the student’s effort level and the
school type, allowing for effort to be more or less productive depending on the type
of school attended. The value-added equation is estimated separately for math and
Spanish test scores. For each student, the math and Spanish residuals are allowed
to be correlated. Students are assumed to not know the error terms when making
their school choices. Working does not directly affect achievement, however, working
makes study effort more costly. The benefits of effort may vary by school type.

1.4.4. Maximization Problem
Student i solves the following maximization problem for their optimal level of effort
e∗ijL for each possible school j and labor option L in their choice set:
7,M
PT
FT
e∗ijL = argmax UijL (eijL , Â7,S
ij (eijL ), Âij (eijL ); Xi , Zj , wi , wi )
eijL

6,M
, A6,S
s.t. Â7,S
ije = fS (Ai
i , eijL ; Xi , Zj )
6,M
Â7,M
, A6,S
ije = fM (Ai
i , eijL ; Xi , Zj )

The first-order equation of the above maximization problem yields the following ex-
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pression for optimal effort:

−
e∗ijL

=

(α3 + α4 P Educi + α5 1{CCT > 0})(δ3S + δ6S Zj + δ3M + δ6M Zj )
+ αi,9 + 1{L = P T }α10
2α11


(1.2)

The parameter αi,9 is a function of the student characteristics, Xi , and the random
shock, ηi . The optimal effort therefore depends on student characteristics, school
characteristics, labor status, and an idiosyncratic preference shock.
Define the dummy variable DijL = 1 if student i chooses school j and labor option
L. Student i then solves the following maximization problem, given their solutions
for optimal effort e∗ijL and the expected achievement that the optimal effort implies
7,M
(Â7,S
ije∗ and Âije∗ ).

max
j,L

Ji
X

X

7,T ∗
∗
PT
FT
Di,j,L × UijL (e∗ijL , Â7,T
ij (eijL ), Âij (eijL ); Xi , Zj , wi , wi )

j=1 L∈{0,P T,F T }

The final result is that each student has an optimal school j and labor option L, and
an optimal effort given these choices, e∗ .

1.5. Estimation
Model parameters are estimated using Maximum Likelihood. Define

M
P (j, L, ASij , AM
ij , ẽijL |Xi , Zj , wij , ηi )

as the joint probability of choosing school j, labor option L, having Grade 7 test
M
scores ASij and AM
ij , and choosing effort measures ẽijL . The probability depends on

student characteristics Xi , school characteristics Zj , imputed wages wij , and the
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random coefficient shock ηi . Although they are not written explicitly in the above
probability, there are several other shocks in the model with defined distributions:
νijL are type I extreme value and ξijM and ξijS are jointly normal.
Define DijL = 1 if student i chose school j and labor option L. The likelihood is then,

L=

Ji
N Z Y
Y
i=1

Y



DijL
M
P (j, L, ASij , AM
fη (ηi )dηi
ij , ẽijL |Xi , Zj , wij , ηi )

j=1 L∈{0,P T,F T }

The joint probability can be decomposed into the product of conditional probabilities.
The variable ẽM
ijL is the effort variable in the data. Two of the conditional probabilities
depend on e∗ijL and using Equation 1.2, e∗ijL can be calculated given the choice of j
and L, along with the data (Xi , Zj ), the random coefficient shock (ηi ) and model
parameters. Conditioning variables in probabilities are dropped in the probability
expressions if the probability does not depend on them.

L=

Ji
N Z Y
Y
i=1

=



M
P (j, L, ASij , AM
ij , ẽijL |Xi , Zj , wij , ηi )

Y



j=1 L∈{0,P T,F T }

Ji
N Z Y
Y
i=1

fη (ηi )dηi

M
P (ASij , AM
ij |j, L, ẽijL ; Xi , Zj , wij , ηi )

×
=

DijL

j=1 L∈{0,P T,F T }

Ji
N Z Y
Y
i=1

Y

Y



P (j, L, ẽM
ijL |Xi , Zj , wij , ηi )

DijL
fη (ηi )dηi

M
P (ASij , AM
ij |j, L, ; Xi , Zj , ηi )P (ẽijL |j, L, Xi , Zj , ηi )

j=1 L∈{0,P T,F T }

DijL
× P (j, L|Xi , Zj , wij , ηi )

fη (ηi )dηi
(1.3)

Consider each of the three probabilities in the likelihood. The first is the probability
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of observing the Grade 7 test scores in Spanish and math:

M
P (ASij , AM
ij |j, L, ẽijL ; Xi , Zj , ηi )

The errors for the two achievement production functions are distributed iid jointly
normal. Given the choice of school and labor, the data and the model parameters,
the measure of effort from the model e∗ijL can be computed. Using all of these inputs,
the expected test scores can be computed using Equation 1.1. Given the normality
assumption, and the expected test scores computed from the model, the probability
of observing the test scores from the data can be computed.
The second probability is the probability of observing the effort measure in the data,
conditional on the optimal effort predicted from the model.

M
∗
P (ẽM
ijL |j, L, Xi , Zj , ηi ) = P (ẽijL |eijL )

Equation 1.2 defines optimal effort in the model. The coefficient αi,9 in the numerator
is a random coefficient with associated shock ηi ∼ N (0, ση2 ). Therefore effort draws
can be thought of as coming from the distribution of the true underlying value of
effort, N (e∗ijL , σe2∗ ). This distribution is used to estimate the probability of observing
the effort value obtained from factor analysis. Because of this, I do not need to
simulate in order to calculate the integral defined in the likelihood.
The third and final probability is the probability of choosing school j and labor option
L.
P (j, L|Xi , Zj , wij , ηi )
The errors for the utility function are distributed iid type I extreme value. The
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probability of a school and work combination can be written as:

P (j, L|Xi , Zj , wij , ηi ) = PJi P
k=1

expU tilityijL

U tilityikh
h∈{0,P T,F T } exp

(1.4)

U tilityijL is a function of e∗ijL , the model parameters, and the data. A scale parameter
is also included in the above probability. The outside option has been normalized to
the value of a wage instead of zero, and the coefficient on the monetary component
is set to 1. Because of this, the scale of the distribution can be estimated.
Given a set of parameter values and the data, all three of these probabilities can be
calculated for each student, and the product of them is defined as the individual likelihood. The likelihood defined in Equation 1.3 can then be calculated, and maximized
to find the estimated parameters.
To calculate the standard errors, I estimate a sandwich-type covariance matrix. Details are in Appendix A.5.

1.5.1. Identification
There are 51 parameters to estimate in the model in total. The list of parameters is
given by
2
3
• Utility function: {αk }11
k=1 , {βk }k=1 , {λk }k=1 , σU
S 15
• Achievement production functions: {δkM }15
k=1 , {δk }k=1 , σM , σS , σM S

• Effort: σE
There are 33 parameters associated with achievement. They are estimated with two
value added equations. Each student who attended Grade 7 has a test score in both
Math and Spanish. Each student also has lagged test scores in both subjects, as well
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as data on the 12 other covariates. There is variation in covariates across schools,
and across students within a school.
There are 16 parameters in the utility function. Two of the parameters are associated
with distance. They are identified by geographic variation in distances in different
children’s choice sets. Each primary school has different schools in its choice set, and
every option is associated with a distance (among other characteristics). School types
that are far away from a specific primary school may be of a good quality, but are
chosen by a small fraction of the students (or not at all), which identifies how costly
students find traveling to school.
Three parameters in the utility function represent school type (General, Technical,
telesecundaria). There are too many schools in the data to have intercepts for each of
them. Instead of having a common intercept in the utility for attending each school,
I assume that the intercept varies by school type. These coefficients are identified by
variation within choice sets as well. Students may chose a certain type of school over
another even though it is farther away or offers a worse expected test score, showing
a preference for this type of school over the other.
Two parameters in the utility function capture how much students value expected
test scores. Two factors come into play here. The first is that students with higher
test scores may get more utility from going to school compared to dropping out. The
second is that achievement is affected by school inputs, so some schools in the choice
set may have higher expected test scores which could make students more likely to
attend. Either of these things being present in the data would identify the coefficients
on test scores.
There are six parameters associated with the marginal cost of effort in the utility func-
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tion. The parameters involved in demographics (parental education, female, lagged
test scores) are identified by the difference in mean effort choices from students with
these different demographics.

1.6. Results
Estimates for the utility parameters are shown in Table 8 and for the test score
production functions are shown in Table 9. All parameters in the utility function
have the units of 100s of pesos per month. The key parameter estimates and patterns
are discussed below. Traveling distance to a middle school is estimated to be costly.
The coefficient on distance squared is positive, showing that as the school gets farther
away, the marginal cost of another kilometer starts to decrease. Both estimates are
significant, even with a small estimation sample compared to the full data sample.
The estimate for the benefit of attending school in the utility is large and positive, and
does not seem to depend on if parents have middle-school education. Technical schools
are estimated to be slightly more valuable than general schools, but the difference
is not significant. Telesecundarias are estimated to be perceived significantly worse
than the other two school types.
The average expected test score has a positive coefficient in the utility function, with
little change depending on parental education and conditional cash transfer status.
The standard deviation of the test scores is approximately 1, meaning that students
and their families place approximately the same value on a school being a kilometer
closer as the school improving math test scores by one and a half standard deviations.
There is a large distaste for working part time. Further, working part time is estimated
to make the marginal cost of effort more negative, so more costly. The coefficient on
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effort squared must be negative to guarantee a solution to the optimal effort problem
in the model, and it is in fact a large negative number. The marginal cost of effort is
estimated to decrease, so effort is less costly, for female students and students with
higher lagged test scores.
The coefficient estimates in the achievement production function, shown in Table
9, are fairly intuitive. Lagged test scores are significant, with lagged math scores
contributing to math predictions, and lagged Spanish scores contributing to Spanish
predictions. Females have negative coefficients in math. Students with higher ages
are estimated to do worse in both math and Spanish. The value added of a Technical
schools is estimated to be greater than a General school in both math and Spanish
whereas telesecundarias are estimated to be worse. The school characteristics coefficients are mainly small in magnitude and insignificant. The one exception is if the
school has internet, which has a positive and significant coefficient. Finally, effort has
a large positive coefficient for both math and Spanish. Effort is estimated to be more
productive in telesecundaria schools compared to General schools, and less productive
in Technical schools, however the change in productivity is small in magnitude.

1.6.1. Model Fit
The following figures show the fit of the model with respect to the true data. There
are three main outcomes to fit: school choice, achievement, and effort. Table 10
shows the model fit for the means and standard deviations of these outcomes. The
simulation means are overall quite close to the means in the data.
Figure 8 shows the fraction of students that choose each of the three school type
options or to drop out in both the simulation and the data. The pattern in the
data is represented in the simulated data, in that General schools are most popular,
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followed by Technical, telesecundarias and then Dropping out. However the values
are slightly off, with somewhat more students choosing to drop out in the model than
in the data.
Considering only the students who choose to drop out, Figure 9 investigates the
relationship between dropping out and distance to the nearest school. Students are
divided into quintiles by the distance to their nearest middle school. The mean
dropout rate for each quintile is then calculated in the data and the model. The
overall pattern matches, but it is apparent that the model is overestimating dropout
rates for students who have a middle school in the same location as their primary
school, or who have a middle school very far away. The students in between are
matched very closely.
Finally, Figure 10 investigates the relationship between students’ effort values and
their lagged test scores. In both the data and the model, students with lower lagged
test scores exert less study efforts than students with higher lagged test scores. The
model captures the relationship in the data very well.

1.7. Evaluation of Child Labor Policies
With my estimated model, I am able to evaluate many relevant policies involving
child labor laws, conditional cash transfers and school availability. The focus for this
paper is to consider the impact of enforcing child labor laws on both dropout and
achievement. Working while enrolled in school is detrimental to achievement, however
I find that for many students they require the income to stay in school, and if they
are not allowed to work while in school they prefer to drop out and work full time.
There are two ways to counter this problem. The first is to fully prohibit child labor,
both while enrolled in school and if the child has dropped out. This makes the outside
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option less appealing and more children will stay in school. The second is to offer
conditional cash transfers as an incentive for students to enroll. The cash transfers
may be the more feasible policy, however program targeting can still pose a challenge
and affect the results, as does the benefit amount offered.
Using the parameter estimates, I draw shocks and simulate choices under the baseline
model. Then, to do the counterfactual exercises, I change either some parameters or
the choice sets that the students face, and simulate again under the modified environment using the same shocks. The results from the two simulations are compared
to evaluate the policy. Of interest are the change in enrollment rates, the change
in achievement, which types of schools have the largest change in enrollment, the
amount of money gained/lost by families, among other outcomes.
The first counterfactual involves removing the part-time labor option. The students
who chose not to work originally are not affected by this policy, and neither are
students who chose to drop out. However, the children who were working while
enrolled in school must decide if they wish to continue studying without the income
they received, or drop out and work full time. This counterfactual could represent a
policy such as teachers being able to better monitor their students, or if there was an
after-school program implemented so that children studied or played sports at school
during hours when they may normally work. The results of this policy are shown in
Table 11. In the estimated model, 22% of students enrolled in school choose to work
at the same time. When working part time is not an option 7% of these students
decide to dropout, increasing the over all dropout rate by 20%, from 8% to 10%. This
is a drastic increase, and represents a large number of students when considering the
entire student population of Mexico. There does not appear to be much change in
effort, Spanish and Math scores when considering all students, so I investigate these
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further.
Table 12 computes statistics for the group of students who would like to work, but
when they are prohibited from working, stay enrolled in school. From this table, it
is clear that they are increasing their efforts, which in turn increases their math and
Spanish scores. Effort increases by an average of 3.3 percent of a standard deviation,
which results in a 2.9 percent of a standard deviation increase in math scores and a
3 percent of a standard deviation increase in Spanish scores.
The final analysis analyzes the characteristics of the students who are most likely
to drop out because of this policy. Table 13 shows the mean value of background
characteristics for the students who would like to work while in school, separated by
if they stay in school or not after the policy. The students who drop out have lower
lagged test scores and have a much higher rate of being a conditional cash transfer
beneficiary. The gender breakdown is very similar and the students that dropout are
only slightly older than those that stay enrolled. The last three rows show that the
students who stay enrolled are much more likely to have one of their parents have at
least a middle school education, and to be in the top half of the income distribution.
Overall, this table shows that the students who are dropping out are the students
who are struggling academically and come from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Increasing the national dropout rate by such a large amount is not an ideal result of a
policy that prohibits working while in school. A possible way to prevent this, would be
to consider prohibiting all labor. This would reduce the value of dropping out, as the
students who dropped out would not receive wages. Results from this counterfactual,
along with the results from the estimated model and the first counterfactual are shown
in Table 14. The numbers show that prohibiting all child labor would have better
impacts than only prohibiting labor while in school, in that the dropout rate is similar
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to the original estimation. Effort and test scores are also slightly higher than in the
baseline model, since students are dedicating all of their time to their studies.
Although prohibiting all child labor may have positive educational outcomes, as a
policy it would be difficult to enforce. Therefore I look to an alternative policy to
encourage enrollment if working part time is prohibited. Luckily in Mexico there is a
well established policy, the conditional cash transfer, that could be modified. In my
third counterfactual, I consider changing the values of the conditional cash transfer
and expanding eligibility for the program.
Figure 11 shows the reduction in dropout rates for three different conditional cash
transfer policies. The x-axis shows an increase in the amount of the transfer, ranging
from the current Prospera transfer amount, to 9 times the current amount. The three
policies change who is offered the conditional cash transfer. Policy 1 is a hypothetical
policy that is not operational, but shows the best that could be achieved with a cash
transfer of the given magnitude. In this policy, any student who would drop out in
counterfactual 1 is offered the transfer. In reality, it would be impossible to target the
policy this way. Policy 2 considers increasing the transfers to the current beneficiaries,
which would be very simple to implement. Policy 3 extends the transfer beneficiaries
to those who currently received Prospera, and those who have an income below the
median.
The results show that increasing the conditional cash transfer payment is a very
effective way of decreasing the dropout rate. For payment amount similar to the
current value, expanding the conditional cash transfer to other low-income families
does not have a significant effect. However, if the cash transfer is increased, then
extending the transfer to these families does drastically help reduce the dropout rate.
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To summarize the results, I find that prohibiting students from working while in
school increases achievement by approximately 3% of a standard deviation, however
it also causes a substantial increase in the dropout rate. If it were possible to ban
all child labor, the dropout rate would remain close to the baseline and achievement
would increase. However, this would be difficult to enforce, and I find that similar
dropout rates can be achieved when working part time is banned and the cash transfer is either increased, or the beneficiaries expanded.

1.8. Conclusion
Increasing human capital is thought to be one of the best ways for developing countries
to achieve growth and to increase equity. Ensuring that all children attend school to a
certain age and receive a high quality education is a priority. Unfortunately, in many
developing countries, child labor is prevalent and it makes providing an education
to all students more challenging. Although there is an extensive literature on school
choice, it is necessary to extend the currently available frameworks to consider the
problem of child labor and how it interacts with school choices. In my model, I
include both schooling and labor choices and I provide a mechanism through which
labor affects educational achievement, which is the study effort that children dedicate
to their education.
Specifically, I develop and estimate a random utility model over discrete school-work
alternatives, where study effort is determined as the outcome of an optimization
problem under each of these alternatives. Students who do not enroll in school are
assumed to work full-time, and receive the associated wage. Students who enroll in
school may choose to work part-time, for which they receive the benefit of a part-time
wage, but incur the cost of increased marginal cost of effort. The results show that
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effort is an important input to achievement, which is estimated with a value added
equation. Students who work, and as a result choose to put in less, end up with lower
achievement than they would if they had not chosen to work.
To estimate my model, I combine several data sources: administrative data on nationwide standardized tests in math and Spanish, survey data from students, parents
and principals, geocode data on school locations, and Mexican census data on local
labor market wages and hours worked. The majority of the model parameters are
precisely estimated.
By removing the part-time labor option from student’s choice sets, I evaluate the
impact of working while in school. I find that for the majority of students, not being
able to work improves their test scores. However, almost 10% of students who would
prefer to work drop out of school to work full time when the part time option is no
longer available. This increases the dropout rate by approximately 20%. I analyze
two policies that could be used in conjunction with prohibiting labor for enrolled
students. The first is to ban all child labor. This removes the incentive to drop out
of school and work full time and reduces the dropout rate, however it would be a
challenging policy to implement. The second policy is to increase the conditional
cash transfer, in both the payment amount and the pool of beneficiaries. I find that
depending on the transfer amount, these policies show considerable potential.
With the model that I have developed and estimated, it is possible to analyze many
other educational policies. I incorporate school choice and locally available schools,
so one possible direction is to consider questions of school access and quality. Especially in rural areas, it is of interest to understand how the conditional cash transfer
interacts with another important education policy in Mexico, the distance education
schools (telesecundarias). In ongoing work, I am considering a range of such policies.
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1.9. Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Test Scores

Grade
Grade
Grade
Grade

6
6
7
7

Math
Spanish
Math
Spanish

Mean
531.2
524.8
501.0
499.2

Standard Deviation
122.5
108.5
101.5
101.3

Scores are for the cohort of students in Grade
7 in 2009. The distributions of the test scores
are approximately normal, as shown in Appendix
A.1.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Wage Imputations
Female
Male
Hourly Wage
13.6 (2.9) 13.4 (2.8)
19.0 (4.1) 19.1 (3.6)
Work and School Weekly Hours
Monthly Wage 1030 (294) 1029 (305)
Hourly Wage
14.2 (2.8) 14.1 (2.3)
Only Work
Weekly Hours
39.4 (3.6) 39.7 (3.1)
Monthly Wage 2236 (459) 2242 (431)
Summary statistics from the two wage regressions: hourly
wages and hours worked per week. Monthly wage is calculated as the product of the hourly wage and the hours worked
per week times four (weeks in a month). Monetary values are
in 2010 pesos. The sample of children used for the imputation
is the estimation sample used throughout the paper.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for School Types

Number of Schools
Proportion of Cohort
Proportion Female
Proportion CCT
Proportion Rural
Mean Class Size
Mean School Cohort Size

General
5,820
0.45
0.50
0.17
0.15
32.3
137

Technical
2,857
0.27
0.50
0.20
0.23
33.9
170

Telesecundaria
15,974
0.20
0.49
0.64
0.87
16.6
22

Private
3,866
0.08
0.50
0.01
0.02
23.6
39

Summary statistics for the four types of middle schools. All data on Grade
7 students in 2009 is used to create this table.
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Table 4: Days Worked per Week and Test Scores
Dependent variable:
(> 0 Day)

Grade 7 Test Score
(> 1 Days)
(> 2 Days)

(1)
Working
Lagged Tests Scores
Female
Age
Mom Middle School
Dad Middle School
Prospera
Constant
Observations
R2

(2)

(> 3 Days)

(3)

(4)

−0.047∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.675∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.183∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.078∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.129∗∗∗
(0.012)
3.890∗∗∗
(0.103)

−0.070∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.675∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.182∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.078∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.130∗∗∗
(0.012)
3.890∗∗∗
(0.103)

−0.106∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.674∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.183∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.077∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.130∗∗∗
(0.012)
3.889∗∗∗
(0.103)

−0.150∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.674∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.183∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.077∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.041∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.131∗∗∗
(0.012)
3.886∗∗∗
(0.103)

64,356
0.505

64,356
0.505

64,356
0.505

64,356
0.506

∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Correlation between days worked per week and test scores in the data. The covariate
“Working” is a dummy variable, and its definition changes depending on the column. In
column (1), “Working” is equal to 1 if students work at least 1 day a week. In column
(2) “Working” is equal to 1 if students work at least 2 days a week, and so on. The
dependent variable is the sum of each student’s Grade 7 math and Spanish test scores.
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Table 5: Working and Study Effort
Dependent variable:
Effort
(1)
Working

(2)

(3)

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

−0.086
(0.011)
0.172∗∗∗
(0.003)

4.698∗∗∗
(0.006)

2.911∗∗∗
(0.028)

−0.204
(0.012)

Lagged Tests Scores
Female
Age
Mom Middle School
Dad Middle School
Prospera
Constant
Observations
R2

64,356
0.005

64,356
0.065
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

−0.070∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.171∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.128∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.121∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.015
(0.011)
0.062∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.234∗∗∗
(0.012)
4.215∗∗∗
(0.100)
64,356
0.077

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Correlation between days worked per week and study effort in the data.
The variable “Working” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a child reports
working at least 1 day a week. The effort variable is the continuous
variable created with factor analysis.
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Table 6: Study Effort and Achievement
Dependent variable:
Grade 7 Test Score
Study Effort

(1)

(2)

0.430∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.190∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.655∗∗∗
(0.003)

8.026∗∗∗
(0.025)

2.460∗∗∗
(0.030)

Lagged Tests Scores

(3)

Female
Age
Mom Middle School
Dad Middle School
Prospera
Constant
Observations
R2

64,356
0.094

64,356
0.517
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

0.182∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.645∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.166∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.057∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.045∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.062∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.012)
3.116∗∗∗
(0.102)
64,356
0.521

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Correlation between study effort and test scores in the data. Test scores
are the sum of Grade 7 math and Spanish scores. The effort variable is
the continuous variable created by factor analysis.
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Table 7: Dropout Rates and Local Wages
Dependent variable:
DropRate
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.051∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.024∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.306∗∗∗
(0.045)

Full Time Wage
Lagged Tests Scores
Mom Middle School
Dad Middle School
Prospera
Constant
Observations
R2
Note:

936
0.222
∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Correlation between the dropout rate and the mean
wage in a municipality. The observations are at the
municipality level. For each municipality, the average
wage is calculated, as well as the average lagged test
scores, the average parental education level, and the
mean proportion of students receiving the conditional
cash transfer. Wages are normalized in this regression
so that a standard deviation is equal to 1.
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Table 8: Utility Function Parameter Estimates
Coefficients
Distance
Distance squared
School
School x Parent Educ
Technical School
Telesecundaria
Expected Score
Expected x Parent Educ
Expected x CCT
Working Part Time
Linear Effort
Linear Effort - Lagged Score
Linear Effort - Female
Linear Effort - Parent Educ
Linear Effort - Work
Quadratic Effort

Estimates Std.Error
-46.49
3.22
1.90
0.13
36.97
17.98
6.42
3.90
11.26
2.43
-37.24
3.99
28.04
3.09
0.39
2.77
0.42
0.13
-56.62
3.71
-33.81
9.62
1.86
0.29
0.94
0.30
-0.53
6.15
-0.43
0.19
-5.23
0.86

Coefficient estimates for parameters in the utility function. The coefficient units are 100s of pesos in 2010.
Estimates come from a random sample of 10,000 students.
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44
0.537
0.253

0.545

Math Std.Error Spanish Estimates Spanish Std.Error
0.455
-0.511
0.493
0.032
-0.06
0.03
0.031
0.305
0.032
0.034
0.133
0.034
0.014
-0.072
0.014
0.122
0.124
0.13
0.192
-0.815
0.21
0.007
-0.026
0.007
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.019
0.151
0.019
0.015
-0.005
0.015
0.009
-0.037
0.009
0.156
1.103
0.156
0.024
-0.019
0.025
0.035
0.151
0.037

Coefficient estimates for parameters in the achievement functions. Estimates come from a random
sample of 10,000 students.

Residual Std Error
Residual Covariance

Coefficients
Math Estimates
Intercept
-0.712
Lagged Math
0.262
Lagged Spanish
0.044
Female
-0.173
Age
-0.084
Technical School
0.069
Telesecondary School 0.363
Principal Education
-0.003
Principal Experience 0.001
School has Internet
0.175
School has Materials -0.034
Teachers are Bad
-0.037
Effort
1.12
Effort X Technical
-0.003
Effort X Tele
-0.065

Table 9: Achievement Functions Parameter Estimates

Table 10: Goodness of Fit: Means and Standard Deviations
Outcome Variable
True Mean Simulated Mean True St.Dev.
Math
5.03
5.28
0.98
Spanish
5.00
5.26
0.98
Effort
4.66
4.67
1.28
Fraction Drop
0.08
0.08
Fraction General
0.44
0.44
Fraction Technical
0.29
0.28
Fraction Telesecundaria
0.19
0.19
Fraction Work PT
0.25
0.22

Simulated St.Dev.
1.59
1.61
1.26

Model fit for relevant means and standard deviations. The values in the “True Mean” and
“True St.Dev.” columns come directly from the data. The values in the “Simulated Mean”
and “Simulated St.Dev” come from simulations using the parameter estimates.

Table 11: Changes in Main Outcomes from Counterfactual 1
Outcome Variable
Fraction Work PT
Fraction Drop
Mean Effort
Mean Spanish
Mean Math

Estimated Model Counterfactual Percent Change
0.22
0.00
-100.00
0.08
0.10
19.28
4.67
4.68
0.26
5.26
5.28
0.40
5.28
5.30
0.38

Changes in outcomes from Counterfactual 1. This counterfactual partially
enforces the child labor laws, so that children who are enrolled in school are
not able to work at the same time (part time work decreases to 0).
Table 12: Effects of Counterfactual 1 on Part Time Workers
Outcome Variable
Effort
Math
Spanish

Estimated Model Counterfactual Change in SD (%)
4.65
4.69
3.27
5.29
5.33
2.92
5.27
5.32
2.96

Changes in outcomes from Counterfactual 1 for students who would like to
work part time, and when they are enable to do so stayed enrolled in school.
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Table 13: Demographics of Students Who Dropout After Counterfactual 1
Background Variables
Stayed In School Dropped Out
Lagged Math
5.17
4.55
Lagged Spanish
5.16
4.51
Female
0.51
0.46
CCT
0.22
0.47
Age
12.00
12.26
Mom has Middle School
0.56
0.32
Dad has Middle School
0.58
0.33
Family Income above Mean
0.43
0.25
Difference in background variables between the students who
dropped out when prohibited from working part time, and the
students who stayed enrolled.

Table 14: Effects of Counterfactual 1 and Counterfactual 2
Outcome Variable
Fraction Work PT
Fraction Drop
Mean Effort
Mean Spanish
Mean Math

Estimated Model Counterfactual 1
0.22
0.00
0.08
0.10
4.67
4.68
5.26
5.28
5.28
5.30

Counterfactual 2
0.00
0.08
4.68
5.26
5.29

Values for key variables from the estimated model, Counterfactual 1 and Counterfactual 2. All results are coming from simulations of the estimated model
using the same draw of errors.
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1.10. Figures
Figure 1: Age Distribution

The distribution of ages of students in Grade 7 in 2009 in the estimation sample.
The survey was completed in the Spring of their Grade 7 year.

Figure 2: Days Worked per Week

The distribution of the number of days worked per week, divided by gender, for
students in Grade 7 in 2009 in the estimation sample.

47

Figure 3: Latent Effort Variable Distribution

The distribution of latent effort values in the estimation sample. This variable
is combines information from five questions related to study effort using factor
analysis.

Figure 4: Map with Schools in Example Neighborhood

Map of all primary schools (red) and middle schools (blue) in a rural region of
Mexico. The upper right corner contains a city while the remaining region is
considered to be rural. There are many more primary schools than there are
middle schools available.
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Figure 5: Map Showing Choice Set in Example Neighborhood

Map of a primary school (red) with the middle schools (blue) included in its choice
set. The choice set is comprised of all schools included in the yellow circle. The
arrows represent the actual choices of students from the primary school. There
are two schools that were not chosen by students in the primary school, but are
included in the choice set given their geographic proximity.
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Figure 6: Study Effort and Test Scores

The correlation between study effort and Grade 7 test scores. The effort variable
on the x-axis is binned into eight categories, and the mean test scores for students
with effort values in the corresponding bin are calculated. There is a positive
relationship between effort and test scores.
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Figure 7: Enrollment Rates and Access to Middle Schools

The relationship between enrollment rates and middle school accessibility. Each
primary school is categorized by the distance to the nearest middle school, which
is the x-axis. For each primary school, the fraction of its students who continue
to Grade 7 is also calculated. The graph shows that primary schools that have
middle schools near by have a higher fraction of their students enroll in middle
school.
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Figure 8: Goodness of Fit: School Types

This figure shows the goodness of fit with respect to the choice of school type.
The fraction of students choosing each of the three school types or dropping out
in Grade 7 is included both in the data and in the estimated model.

Figure 9: Goodness of Fit: Enrollment and Accessibility

This figure shows the goodness of fit with respect to the enrollment rates and
the school accessibility. The fraction of students who dropout is broken down by
how far away the nearest school is from their primary school.
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Figure 10: Goodness of Fit: Effort and Achievement

This figure shows the goodness of fit of the model with respect to the relationship
between effort and achievement. The effort variable from the data and the effort
variable generated by the model are plotted as a function of average lagged test
scores.
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Figure 11: Counterfactual 3: Dropout Rate and Conditional Cash Transfers

The fraction of students who dropout when considering three different conditional
cash transfer policies. Policy 1 offers the transfer to any student who wants to
drop out. Policy 2 offers the transfer to current beneficiaries. Policy 3 offers
the transfer to current beneficiaries and students whose family earns below the
median income.
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CHAPTER 2 : The Marginal Returns to Distance Education:
Evidence from Mexico’s Telesecundarias, with Emilio
Borghesan
2.1. Introduction
The rise of the internet and video-conferencing platforms has made distance learning
an attractive option for students across much of the world. For students in remote
locations, distance learning offers access to great instructors at a fraction of the
cost of traditional brick-and-mortar schools.1 However, lectures delivered through a
screen may be less effective than the more hands-on approach employed in traditional
schools.
Any analysis of distance learning depends on both the definition of distance learning
used and on the specific alternative to which it is compared. In this paper, we study
the effectiveness of distance education on student achievement in Mexico relative to
traditional Mexican schools. Since 1968, Mexico has undertaken an ambitious effort to
provide distance education to secondary and post-secondary school students.2 Starting in the seventh grade, students in Mexico have the option of attending so-called
telesecundarias, brick-and-mortar establishments where lectures that have been prerecorded by high quality instructors in Mexico City are transmitted through television
broadcast. Students embarking upon a secondary school education therefore decide
between a traditional school with subject-specific teachers and in-class instruction
1

The cost per student of providing high-quality distance education for secondary school students
in Mexico, the setting of this paper, is approximately one-half that of providing instruction in
traditional schools (Martinez Rizo, 2005).
2
Secondary schools in Mexico enroll students in grades seven through nine and are akin to middle
schools in the United States, while post-secondary schools enroll students in grades ten through
twelve. Throughout the paper, we use the words “secondary” and “post-secondary” to be consistent
with the Mexican educational system.
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and a telesecundaria that provides televised lectures and standardized assignments
all under the supervision of a single adult monitor.
This paper combines a value-added model with a semiparametric sample selection
model to evaluate the effect of telesecundaria attendance on student learning. We
measure learning in two subjects, math and Spanish, by value added: the intertemporal difference in test scores in nationally standardized exams administered immediately before and one year after the start of secondary school. We define the relative
effectiveness of telesecundarias as the difference in value added between the two school
types. Focusing on value-added allows us to quantify the degree of learning that is
attributable to the school the student attends, while the use of a selection model
allows students to choose schools on the basis of characteristics that are unobserved
by the econometrician.
We use data on national standardized tests in math and Spanish, the Evaluación
National de Logro Académico en Centros Escolares (ENLACE), and augment it with
surveys of students, parents, and principals from a random sample of schools as well
as geocode data identifying the location of each school. The surveys provide a rich
set of observed characteristics of both the child and her family, while the ENLACE
and geocode data provide us with information on the school choice of each student,
including the location and type of school attended, as well as test scores in math
and Spanish at the end of the last year of primary school (sixth grade) and the first
year of secondary school (seventh grade). Controlling for sixth grade test scores lets
us isolate how much student knowledge in seventh grade is due to secondary school
attendance alone.
We use a semiparametric sample selection model to allow for correlation between
a student’s choice of school and unobserved determinants of academic outcomes at
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each school. Any sample selection model requires an instrumental variable that affects
the decision of which school to attend but does not directly affect outcomes at each
school. The instrument we use in this paper is a measure of relative distance. For
each student, we have two distance measures. The first is the distance between their
primary school and the nearest telesecundaria. The second is the distance between
their primary school and the nearest traditional secondary school. Our instrument is
the difference between these two measures: distance to telesecundaria minus distance
to traditional school.3
This instrumental variable is highly predictive of attendance in telesecundarias: A
one kilometer reduction, meaning the telesecundaria becomes relatively closer, causes
the student’s probability of attending a telesecundaria to increase by 3.3% on average.
Cameron and Taber (2004) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002) have raised concerns
that distance to secondary school is correlated with student ability in the United
States. We discuss why endogeneity of this sort is less likely in the Mexican context
than in the United States. As a robustness check, we include the distance students
actually travel to secondary school in our outcome equations and find that our results
are unchanged.
We find that telesecundarias are highly beneficial: The average treatment effect (ATE)
of telesecundaria attendance relative to attendance in traditional schools is a 0.342
standard deviation increase in math scores and a 0.218 standard deviation increase
in Spanish scores after just one year of attendance. These ATEs conceal considerable
heterogeneity in who benefits from telesecundarias: some students see gains of over
0.5 standard deviations while others experience no benefit.
3

A large body of empirical work uses a measure of distance to school as an instrument. See
Card (1995), Kane and Rouse (1995), Kling (2001), Currie and Moretti (2003), Cameron and Taber
(2004), Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011), and Carneiro, Lokshin, and Umapathi (2017).
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Our analysis uncovers a pattern of nonmonotonic selection into telesecundarias. Students who are the most likely to attend benefit less than students who are slightly less
likely to attend. These students in turn benefit more than students who are relatively
unlikely to attend. We estimate Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) curves for math
and Spanish that reject the hypothesis of no selection on unobservables.
We then investigate the reasons behind the nonmonotonic pattern of selection. We
decompose the MTEs into a component that depends only on the match between students and telesecundarias and another component that depends only on the match
between students and traditional schools. This decomposition reveals that nonmonotonicity in the MTEs for math and Spanish stem from considerable heterogeneity in
the quality of the match between students and traditional secondary schools among
students who are likely to choose telesecundarias.
We use our estimated MTEs to evaluate counterfactual policies that expand the
availability of telesecundarias. The first policy we consider is a dramatic increase in
telesecundaria availability that reduces the distance to telesecundarias for everyone in
the sample by 5 km. The second policy under consideration is a school-construction
program that builds a telesecundaria adjacent to the 18% of Mexican primary schools
without a telesecundaria within 5 km. We find that the first policy raises math
(Spanish) scores by 0.360 (0.242) standard deviations, while the second raises scores
by 0.223 (0.164) standard deviations. The effects of the counterfactual policies differ
and neither correspond to the estimates obtained by Two-Stage Least Squares which
use distance as an instrument (0.300 and 0.173 standard deviations for math and
Spanish, respectively), highlighting the importance of adopting a framework allowing
for heterogeneous treatment effects and self-selection as we do in this paper.
Our results are similar to those in Bianchi, Lu, and Song (2020), who study the
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effect of distance education in rural China on academic and labor market outcomes.
Exploiting the differential rollout of a distance education initiative across space and
time in a difference-in-differences design, they find that exposure to computer-aided
learning raises math skills by 0.18 standard deviations and Chinese skills by 0.23
standard deviations. Relative to their paper, we examine the effect on educational
outcomes after a year of attendance rather than seven to ten years later, we allow for
the choice of school to be nonrandom, and we demonstrate the extent of heterogeneity
in educational outcomes for students with various probabilities of enrolling in distance
education.
Our study has several main contributions. First, we believe that this is the first
empirical setting in the education literature in which the Marginal Treatment Effect
can be nonparametrically identified over its entire support. We are able to precisely
compute all treatment parameters and the effects of counterfactual policies using our
semiparametric estimates of the MTE. The reasons for nonparametric identification
stem from the both the large size of the sample (over 120, 000 observations) and the
strong instrument, which induces significant variation in the probability of attending a telesecundaria. Nonparametric identification turns out to be important, as the
MTE is nonmonotonic and parametric approaches fail to identify this feature4 . In
addition, our paper is the first to consider the impact of telesecundarias on academic
achievement. With our unique data, we are able to identify the schooling options
available to each student and associate potential academic outcomes with attendance
in each type of school, thereby allowing us to estimate the effect of telesecundarias
on academic achievement.
4

Specifically, parametric approaches based on jointly normal observables, common in this literature, would be unable to identify this feature. A fifth-order polynomial would capture the MTE
curve well, however it would be impossible to know this a priori, as it requires being able to observe
the shape of the nonparametric curve.
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2.2. Related Literature
A large literature examines the interaction of technology and education and is surveyed in three excellent recent papers by Bulman and Fairlie (2016), Escueta, Quan,
Nickow, and Oreopoulos (2017), and Rodriguez-Segura (2020). Papers that examine
the effectiveness of distance learning in developing countries are much fewer in number. Beg, Lucas, Halim, and Saif (2019) use data from two randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) in Pakistan and find that the combination of high quality videos with
in-person teaching raises student performance on standardized tests. In another RCT,
Johnston and Ksoll (2017) find that a similar program in Ghana, which broadcasts
live instruction from experts into rural schools, had a positive impact on test scores.
Given the positive findings on distance education, it is perhaps surprising that this
low-cost alternative is not prevalent in developing countries and rural areas around
the world. Our paper validates these findings from RCTs by conducting analysis of
a longstanding distance education policy using observational data and a framework
that allows for nonrandom school choice.
A burgeoning literature evaluates the effects of schooling using sample selection models similar to the one in this paper. Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011) evaluate
the decision to attend college in the United States. They find evidence of considerable
heterogeneity in the pecuniary returns to college attendance and a pattern of positive
sorting on gains: When considering policies that expand college attendance, they find
that the returns to the marginal student induced to attend college are signficantly
lower than the returns to students already attending college. Carneiro, Lokshin, and
Umapathi (2017) use similar methods to analyze the pecuniary returns to secondary
school attendance in Indonesia. Using distance to the nearest secondary school as an
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instrument that influences the probability of attendance but not outcomes directly,
they also find positive sorting on gains and considerable heterogeneity, whereby the
students with the lowest likelihood of secondary school attendance actually have negative returns. Cornelissen, Dustmann, Raute, and Schönberg (2018) analyze the
decision of parents to enroll their children in day care in Germany, and, contrary to
the two previous papers, find a pattern of reverse sorting on gains. Students who are
not enrolled in Germany’s universal child care program would experience increases in
their readiness for primary school had they attended child care, while those currently
attending experience little benefit. The authors conclude that universal child care disproportionately subsidizes families that are well-off and is not sufficiently accessible
for minority households.
Although telesecundarias are widespread and have existed for over 50 years, little
research on their effectiveness exists. Recently, two papers have used difference-indifferences designs to estimate the effect of proximity to Telescondaries on educational
attainment and labor market outcomes (Fabregas (2020), Navarro-Sola (2019)). Both
papers use data from the Mexican Census and thus lack information on student test
scores and the type of school attended. Even without this information, both papers
find that telesecundarias raise educational attainment and future income, although
the estimates in Navarro-Sola (2019) are substantially larger than those in Fabregas
(2020). Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2020) look at the impact of conditional cash
transfers on schooling trajectories and find that cash transfers primarily raise schooling through increasing enrollment in telesecundarias.
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2.3. Secondary Schooling in Mexico
Throughout the twentieth century, Mexico struggled to attract qualified teachers to
rural areas to instruct the millions of school-age children living there. Introduced in
1968 Telesecundarias were seen as a solution to this problem. Telesecundarias are
physical structures with four key scholastic components. The first is the television
program. Every subject begins with students watching 15 minutes of a pre-recorded
televised lecture. Lectures for each subject are recorded in Mexico City by highquality instructors, so-called Telemaestros, who are selected for their communication
skills.
Following the video lectures, a single teacher leads students in a 35-minute lesson on
the same subject. The teacher does not specialize in a particular subject: Students
have the same teacher for all courses. This teacher follows a teaching guide designed
for the telesecundarias filled with teaching suggestions for each subject. The 35
minutes are spent in myriad ways, with the teacher leading question and answer
sessions, engaging students in group activities, and giving assignments for students
to do on their own.
The third educational resource is an encyclopedia-like book that contains the essential information in each subject taught during that year. These books are similar
to textbooks in traditional secondary schools and are used by students as references
while doing their assignments. The final component of telesecundaria education is
the learning guide. Like a workbook, learning guides are filled with questions that
students can answer individually as well as suggestions for group activities that reinforce learning. Class time is frequently devoted to doing assignments in the learning
guides.
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The four main educational components – televised instruction, in-person teaching,
reference texts, and learning guides – are designed to be complementary. Students
evidently see them that way: Ethnographic research indicates that students see
each component as reinforcing the knowledge acquired through the televised lectures
(Estrada (2003)).
Telesecundarias were first introduced in rural areas and predominate in Mexico’s
poorer South. While they have expanded into suburban and urban area, students
from the South and from rural areas are still over-represented (see Table 17). A reform in 1993 mandated schooling through grade nine and resulted in increases in the
construction of both new telesecundarias and telesecundaria enrollment. We study
a single cohort, those students who were in grade six in 2007/08, after secondary
schooling became compulsory.

2.4. Model
2.4.1. Student Achievement
We apply the potential outcomes framework of Rubin (1974) to a value-added model
of learning. Students can either attend a telesecundaria or a traditional school.5 We
define the random variable D where D = 1 denotes attendance in a telesecundaria
and D = 0 denotes attendance in a traditional school. We study the effects of
telesecundaria attendance on two outcomes: math and Spanish test scores in seventh
5

Mexico has three secondary school types: General, Technical, and Telesecundaria. We consider
the choice between a traditional school (General/Technical) and a telesecundaria. Table 16 reveals
that General and Technical school have similar distributions of observable household characteristics
and student student test scores, so we feel that it is reasonable to consider them as a single alternative
for the purposes of evaluating learning in math and Spanish between the sixth and seventh grades.
However, the ensuing analysis goes through without modification if they are treated as separate
alternatives as long as the results are re-interpreted as the causal effect of telesecundaria education
relative to the next best alternative. A small fraction (less than 8% of full sample) of students in
Mexico attend Private schools. We exclude them from the analysis. Students who drop out are also
omitted (less than 8% of full sample).
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grade. For each course C ∈ {Math, Spanish}, the potential outcomes Y0C and Y1C
correspond to the test score a student would achieve had she enrolled in a traditional
or telesecundaria, respectively. For ease of notation, we will omit the C superscripts.
The same causal model will be used for each of the two outcomes.
We model test score outcomes and school choice according to the selection model in
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005):

Y1 = Xβ1 + U1 ,

(2.1)

Y0 = Xβ0 + U0 ,

(2.2)

D = 1(Zγ > V ) ,

(2.3)

where X is a vector of observable characteristics influencing outcomes, Z is a vector of
observable characteristics influencing the choice of secondary school, and (U1 , U0 , V )
are unobserved by the econometrician. Students are assumed to know (U1 , U0 , V )
and may act upon them. Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are value-added equations: X
contains the previous year’s test scores in both math and Spanish6 . As demonstrated
in Todd and Wolpin (2003), such a specification is consistent with an educational
production function in which the effects of time-varying investments on test scores
decline geometrically with the time between when the investment was made and when
the test was taken.
The effect of attending a telesecundaria relative to a traditional school on the test
scores for an individual is given by Y1 − Y0 , and the average effect for individuals
with a specific set of observable characteristics is AT E(X) = E[Y1 − Y0 |X = x].
The fundamental challenge in estimating any sort of treatment effect is that the
6

We assume that lagged test scores are sufficient to capture each student’s human capital accumulation up to this point
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econometrician only observes one of the two potential outcomes, Y = Y0 +D(Y1 −Y0 ).
The instrument, Z, is an exclusion that must simultaneously induce variation in the
choice of school conditional on the covariates, X, and have no direct effect on the
outcome variable. When Z is a sufficiently strong instrument, as in this paper, it
can shift the probability of attending a telesecundaria continuously between 0 and 1.
Such a shift would cause even the most unlikely student to attend a telesecundaria,
thus allowing us to compare Y0 and Y1 for all individuals.
The Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE), introduced by Björklund and Moffitt (1987)
and extended in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999; 2001b; 2005; 2007), is the average
treatment effect for an individual at a particular margin of “resistance to treatment.”
V , in equation (2.3), represents this resistance to treatment. An individual with a
higher V is, on the basis of unobservables, less likely to attend a telesecundaria. We
apply the following useful transformation to equation (2.3) to obtain D = 1(Zγ >
V ) = 1(FV (Zγ) > FV (V )) = 1(P (Z) > UD ), where P (Z) is the propensity score and
UD ∼ U [0, 1]. Following the transformation, the MTE can be written as

M T E(x, uD ) = E[Y1 − Y0 |X = x, UD = uD ] .

(2.4)

The Marginal Treatment Effect gives the average difference in outcomes at telesecundarias relative to traditional schools for individuals with observable characteristics x
and latent resistance to treatment uD .

2.4.2. Identification
The Marginal Treatment Effect is identified under the following assumptions, stated
in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and modified slightly to fit the notation presented
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here:
(A-1) Z is a nondegenerate random variable conditional on X.
|=

(A-2) (U0 , U1 , UD ) Z|X.
(A-3) UD is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesque measure.
(A-4) E|Y1 | and E|Y0 | are finite.
(A-5) 1 > P(D = 1|X) > 0
Assumption (A-1) ensures that the instrument influences attendance in telesecundarias conditional on covariates, X, while (A-2) assumes that the instrument is exogenous in the sense that it is independent of unobservable variables in the selection
and outcome equations conditional on X. Assumptions (A-3) - (A-5) are technical assumptions that are satisfied in our setting. Under these assumptions, M T E(X, UD ) is
nonparametrically identified by the Local Instrumental Variables estimand (Heckman
and Vytlacil (2001a)):
∂E[Y |X = x, P (z) = p]
= M T E(X, p) .
∂p

Thus, the Marginal Treatment Effect at each value of the latent resistance to treatment, UD , is identified by individuals who are indifferent between being treated and
not, because when p = UD , the individual is on the knife edge between participating
and not participating.
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2.4.3. Parameters of Interest
A large class of parameters corresponding to the effect of telesecundaria attendance on
schooling outcomes can be written as weighted averages of the Marginal Treatment
Effect. In this paper we are interested in AT E(X), as well as the average effect
of treatment on the treated, T T (X) = E[Y1 − Y0 | X = x, D = 1], the average
effect of treatment on the untreated, T U T (X) = E[Y1 − Y0 | X = x, D = 0], and a
range of treatment effects corresponding to the effects of never-before implemented
policies. These Policy-Relevant Treatment Effects, first defined in Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001b), are defined for a shift from a pre-existing policy a to a new policy
a0 and provide a normalized effect of the policy change:

P RT Ea0 ,a (X)

E[Ya0 − Ya | X = x]
.
P(Da0 = 1 | X = x) − P(Da = 1 | X = x)

(2.5)

Any treatment parameter, including AT E, T T , T U T , and P RT Ea0 ,a for policies a
and a0 , can be computed by integrating the MTE with respect to the distribution of
UD induced by the treatment parameter under consideration:
Z
AT E =

M T E(X, UD )dF (X, UD ) ,
Z

TT =

M T E(X, UD )dFUD ,X|D=1 (x, uD | D = 1) ,

(2.6)

M T E(X, UD )dFUD ,X|D=0 (x, uD | D = 0) ,

(2.7)

M T E(X, UD )dFUD ,X|Da =0,Da0 =1 (x, uD | Da = 0, Da0 = 1) .

(2.8)

Z
T UT =
Z
P RT Ea0 ,a =

Section 2.6 discusses the methods we use to integrate the MTE to obtain these treatment parameters.
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2.5. Data
We examine a single cohort, students who were in the sixth grade in 2007/08, and
combine data on them from three different sources. The first is an administrative
data set with student scores on nationally-standardized tests in math and Spanish.
These exams, the Evaluación National de Logro Académico en Centros Escolares,
from now on ENLACE, were administered at the end of each school year in 2007/08
and 2008/09. In addition to test scores, this data set contains information on the age,
gender, conditional cash transfer status, school attendance, school ID, and school type
for each student.
We link the test score data with information on student, parent, and school characteristics from a random survey of schools administered during the years the ENLACE
exam was administered. These surveys provide detailed information on parental education, monthly family income, home infrastructure, number of siblings, and other
household characteristics.
Finally, we collect the latitude and longitude of each primary and secondary school
and calculate the distance (in kilometers) between the primary school each student
attends and the nearest secondary school of each type. We subtract the distance
to the nearest traditional school from the distance to the nearest telesecundaria to
obtain a measure of relative distance. We use this relative distance measure as an
exclusion restriction which affects the choice of school, D, but does not affect outcomes, Y1 and Y0 , directly. While it might be preferable to measure distance from
the student’s actual home (rather than primary school) to each secondary school, this
relies on data that are not available in any of our sources. In section 2.5.1, we show
that the instrument that we have constructed is highly predictive of attendance in
telesecundarias.
68

Figure 12 shows the distribution of the instrument by school attendance. A negative
value on the x-axis indicates that a telesecundaria is closer, while a positive value
indicates that a traditional school is closer. The figure reveals that students mostly
attend the school that is closer, but when the two schools are equally close (distance
= 0), many more students attend traditional schools.
We omit from our analysis students whose relative distance measure lies outside the
middle 99% of the distribution and students who attend a secondary school more than
15 km from their primary school. This is done for two reasons. First, we want to
consider students who have a choice set consisting of two feasible alternatives, and so
we drop students with only one nearby school. Second, we want to omit students who
move to a different school district. Such movements could cause correlation between
the instrument and the outcomes, Y1 and Y0 . We also omit students who drop out.
We end up with a sample of 126,590 students. In Section 2.7, we discuss how omitting
dropouts influences the interpretation of our counterfactual analysis.
Table 15 lists all the outcome variables (Y ), covariates (X), and the instrumental variable (Z\X) that we use in our empirical analysis. Apart from the outcome variables,
sixth grade test scores, and the instrument, all variables are categorical.
Variable Definition
Y
Math score in 7th grade, Spanish score in 7th grade
Parent: Mother’s education, family income, Prospera status, rural residence, residence in Northern state, number of books in the home, whether
the family has access to a computer.
X
Child: Math score in 6th grade, Spanish score in 6th grade, age, sex,
number of siblings.
Relative distance between the nearest Telescondary and the nearest traZ\X
ditional school.

Table 15: Variables Used in Estimation
We present summary statistics for these variables in Table 17 by school type. The
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table reveals that students who attend telesecundarias are disadvataged according to
a wide range of metrics relative to students who attend traditional schools. They are
disproportionately beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer program Prospera,
they come from poorer household with less educated mothers, and they fare worse
academically in the year prior to secondary school.7 Nevertheless, they make up
nearly half of the gap in Spanish and nearly the entire gap in Math relative to their
peers at traditional secondary schools after just a year of telesecundaria attendance.

2.5.1. Is Relative Distance a Valid Instrument?
Identification of the Marginal Treatment Effect requires that the instrument satisfy
(A-1) and (A-2)’. The first assumption, that relative distance predict attendance
in telesecundarias conditional on observable covariates, X, is easily verified. Table
18 displays the average marginal effects of each variable in Z on the probability
of attending telesecundaria (estimated via Probit). The average marginal effect of
relative distance on the probability of attending telesecundaria is 3.3% per kilometer
and highly significant.
The second assumption, that the instrument be independent of unobservable variables
in the outcome and selection equations (U1 , U0 , V ), is untestable. In what follows, we
discuss potential threats to instrumental exogeneity.
Since our specification controls for lagged test scores in addition to family and child
characteristics, any threats to instrument exogeneity, specifically Assumption (A1), must be caused by a correlation between distance and unobserved time-varying
7

The conditional cash transfer program in Mexico began in 1997 and has been has been called
PROGRESA, Oportunidades, and Prospera. The main educational component of the program is
that families receive a cash transfer if their child is enrolled in school. Parker and Todd (2017)
provide a review of the literature on the effects of conditional cash transfer in Mexico and conclude
that it has been effective in increasing school enrollment, reducing grade retention, and increasing
educational attainment.
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determinants of student outcomes that occur between the sixth and the seventh grade.
Such a correlation could occur if parents knew their child’s realizations of U1 and
U0 and moved to be closer to the school with the higher unobserved outcome. As
discussed in section 2.5, we drop from the sample any children who attend a secondary
school more than 15 km from their primary school in an effort to eliminate this threat
to exogeneity.
Another threat to identification could be that the distance traveled to school directly
causes worse academic performance. This could occur if fatigue caused by walking
long distances to school lowered a student’s ability to concentrate. To alleviate this
concern, we conduct a robustness check that controls for the distance actually traveled to secondary school in equations (2.1) and (2.2). Reassuringly, our estimates of
the MTE and treatment parameters are unaffected by its inclusion.

2.6. Estimation
Estimating M T E(X, UD ) under assumptions (A-1) - (A-5) require that we estimate
M T E(X, UD ) separately for each X. When X is high-dimensional, as in our setting,
M T E(X, UD ) is only identified by the support of P (Z) given X. Even if the unconditional support of P (Z) is the entire unit interval, supp(P (Z)) | X = x) may consist
of only a few points. Since this will be too few to estimate M T E(X, UD ) with any

(A-2)’ (X, Z)

|=

degree of precision, we strengthen assumption (A-2) to (A-2)’:
(U1 , U0 , UD )

Assumption (A-2)’ is standard in the literature estimating selection models. It has
two consequences. Under this assumption, the MTE is additively separable in X and
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UD so that

M T E(X, UD ) = X(β1 − β0 ) + K(UD ) .

An additional consequence of assumption (A-2)’ is that M T E(X, UD ) can now be
identified over the unconditional support of P (Z) rather than supp(P (Z) | X). The
cost of the assumption is that it restricts the pattern of selection on unobservables –
given by the shape of M T E(X, ·) – to be the same across individuals with different
observable characteristics, X. It rules out the possibility that M T E(X, ·) has a
different slope depending on the value of X (level shifts can be accommodated). In
Appendix B.1, we consider the validity of this restriction, by binning X according to
observable characteristics and estimating M T E(X, UD ) separately on the subsamples
defined by these bins. Reassuringly, the shape of selection does not vary much across
the different subsamples. Only statistically significant level shifts in M T E(X, UD )
are apparent across the different groups.
We estimate the MTE using two methods: a fully parametric approach that specifies
the distribution of unobservables and a semiparametric approach that leaves the joint
distribution of unobservables unspecified and estimates

∂E[Y |X=x,P (z)=p]
∂p

using Local

Polynomial Modeling.
The fully parametric approach specifies the unobservables in the selection and outcome equations as jointly normally distributed:
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(2.9)
.

Under these assumptions, the Marginal Treatment Effect has the following simple
functional form:

M T E(X, uD ) = X(β1 − β0 ) + (σ1V − σ0V )Φ−1 (UD ) .

We estimate the parameters β1 , β0 , σ1V , σ0V via a two-step method that first estimates
the propensity score via Probit and then includes control functions in the outcome
equations as follows:

E(Y1 | D = 1, X, Z) = Xβ1 + E(U1 | D = 1) ,


φ(Φ−1 (P (Z)))
,
= Xβ1 + σ1V −
P (Z)
E(Y0 | D = 0, X, Z) = Xβ0 + E(U0 | D = 0) ,


φ(Φ−1 (P (Z)))
.
= Xβ0 + σ0V
1 − P (Z)

The second approach is the semiparametric Local Instrumental Variables Estimator
developed in Heckman and Vytlacil (2001a). This approach differs from the Generalized Roy Model in that it does not make any assumption regarding the joint
distribution of (U1 , U0 , V ).8 We estimate

∂E[Y |X=x,P (z)=p]
∂p

using the partially linear

model estimator of Robinson (1988). To understand the approach note that, assumptions (A-1), (A-2)’, (A-3) - (A-5), together with the assumption that the outcome
models in (2.1) and (2.2) are linear, yields a conditional expectation function that
is linear in X and XP and nonlinear in the propensity score, P . The conditional
expectation function is defined below, where K(P) is some nonparametric function of
8

We estimate the propensity score model using a Probit which assumes normality of the marginal
distribution of V , but makes no assumption regarding its joint distribution with (U1 , U0 ).
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the propensity score:

E[Y |X = x, P (z) = p] = E[Y0 + D(Y1 − Y0 )|X = x, P (z) = p]
= Xβ0 + E[DX(β1 − β0 )|X = x, P (z) = p]+
E[U0 + D(U1 − U0 )|X = x, P (z) = p]
= Xβ0 + P X(β1 − β0 ) + K(P ) .

Because of this form for the conditional expectation, the Marginal Treatment Effect
evaluated at UD = P is given by

M T E(X, P ) = X(β1 − β0 ) +

∂K(P )
.
∂P

(2.10)

The semiparametric estimator of (2.10) entails two steps. First, the estimated propensity score, P , is partialed out of the other variables by running nonparametric regressions of Y , X, and P X on P . Then the residualized Y is regressed linearly on the
residualized X and P X to obtain estimates of β0 and β1 − β0 . In the second step,
the derivative of the conditional expectation of Ỹ ≡ Y − X β̂0 − XP (β̂1 − β̂0 ) with
respect of P is estimated nonparametrically to obtain an estimate of

∂K(P )
.
∂P

All nonparametric regressions are estimated using local polynomial regression. Following the recommendations in Fan and Gijbels (1996) we use local linear regression
to estimate the conditional expectations in the first stage and local quadratic regression to estimate

∂K(P )
∂P

in the second stage. A single bandwidth is used for all

nonparametric regressions for a particular outcome (math or Spanish scores). We
choose bandwidths using the plug-in estimator of Fan and Gijbels (1996), which aims
to minimize the Integrated Mean Square Error (IMSE) in the final nonparametric
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regression. The IMSE-minimizing bandwidth depends negatively on the function’s
curvature (second derivative) and on the density of the data, and positively on the
conditional variance of the outcome variable. The plug-in method selects a bandwidth
of 0.28 for both math and Spanish.
We compute treatment parameters for both the parametric and semiparametric approaches. Formulas exist for the parametric approach:

AT E = X̄(β1 − β0 ) ,
NT
1 X
Di {Xi (β1 − β0 ) + E[U1 − U0 |Di = 1]} ,
TT =
NT i=1
NG
1 X
T UT =
(1 − Di ){Xi (β1 − β0 ) + E[U1 − U0 |Di = 0]} ,
NG i=1

where Di = 1 if an individual attends a telesecundaria and 0 otherwise, NT denotes
the number of students attending telesecundarias, and NG denotes the number of
students attending traditional schools. As a result of the assumption that (U1 , U0 , V )


−1 (P (Z)))
are jointly normally distributed, E[U1 − U0 |Di = 1] = (σ1V − σ0V ) − φ(Φ P (Z)
 −1

(Z)))
and E[U1 − U0 |Di = 0] = (σ1V − σ0V ) φ(Φ1−P(P(Z)
For the semiparametric approach, we integrate M T E(X, UD ) with respect to the appropriate distributions in equations (2.6) - (2.8) using the simulation method introduced in Carneiro, Lokshin, and Umapathi (2017). The simulation approach, which
is only valid under assumption (A-2)’, involves creating an equally-spaced grid for
UD for each individual and averaging M T E(X, UD ) for the values of UD on the grid
that are less than that individual’s propensity score P (Z) for TT, greater than that
individual’s propensity score for TUT, and between P (Za ) and P (Za0 ) for PRTE.
Figure 16 displays the densities used to compute ATE, TT, and TUT plotted as a
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function of UD . The figures show that ATE uniformly samples individuals with all
levels of UD while TT oversamples individuals with low UD and TUT oversamples
individuals with high UD .

2.6.1. Empirical Results
Figure 14 presents the MTEs for seventh grade math scores evaluated at mean values
of X. The parametric and semiparametric MTEs are plotted side-by-side with 90%
confidence bands in grey. Figure 15 repeats the analysis with Spanish as the outcome
variable. In both figures, the horizontal axis measures the latent variable UD , while
the vertical axis measures the expected benefit to attending a telesecundaria relative
to a general school for students with that level of UD , E[Y1 − Y0 |X = x, UD = uD ].
The MTEs in both figures are precisely estimated.
The semiparametric figures reveal a pattern of non-monotonic selection on gains.
Students who, on the basis of unobservables, are most likely to attend telesecundarias
(low UD ) have value added that is indistinguishable from zero for both math and
Spanish. As UD increases, students are less likely to attend telesecundarias but their
benefits from attendance increase rapidly to a peak at about UD = 0.35 for both
Math and Spanish. The average benefit to attending telesecundarias is positive and
statistically significant for students with this level of UD . From this point onward,
as UD increases, average benefits decrease in both math and Spanish, although there
are large (but noisy) gains to telesecundaria attendance for students with the largest
values of UD .
While the MTEs for both math and Spanish have similar shapes, the pattern of
nonmonotonic selection is more pronounced for Spanish than for math. The Spanish
MTE curve also displays greater variability, ranging from 0.04 at UD = 0 to 0.96 at
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UD = 1, while math ranges from −0.06 at UD = 0 to 0.76 at UD = 1.
Tables 19 and 20 present estimates of standard treatment parameters for math and
Spanish, respectively. All treatment parameters are positive, underscoring the findings from the MTE curve that telesecundaria attendance is beneficial for a large majority of students. Standard errors reveal that the treatment parameters are precisely
estimated and are significant at conventional levels of significance. The semiparametric estimate of the ATE for math indicates that a randomly selected student would
be expected to perform 0.342 standard deviations better in mathematics in the seventh grade had she attended a telesecundaria instead of a traditional school. The
estimates of TT (0.279 standard deviations) are smaller than those of TUT (0.356),
highlighting that while selection is nonmononotic, it is mostly negative selection (an
upward-sloping MTE) rather than positive selection (downward-sloping MTE). The
semiparametric estimates of ATE, TT, and TUT for Spanish are 0.218, 0.168, and
0.229 standard deviations, respectively, smaller than for math, but still revealing
evidence of negative selection.
The parametric estimates of treatment parameters for math are noticeably higher
than the semiparametric estimates. The parametric approach forces the MTE curve
to be monotonic, and so does a bad job of estimating the MTE for both Math and
Spanish, but the misspecification is worse for math than for Spanish. Parametric
estimates for Spanish are quite similar to the semiparametric estimates, owing to the
fact that Spanish’s parametric MTE curve is well-centered between the maxima and
minima of the semiparametric MTE curve.
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2.6.2. Evidence of Selection on Unobservables
A Marginal Treatment Effect that is nonconstant in UD is evidence of a pattern of
selection on unobservables. We test formally for evidence of selection using methods
developed in Heckman, Schmierer, and Urzua (2010). As explained in Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005), the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) introduced by Imbens
and Angrist (1994) is simply the integral of the MTE over a region of the domain of
UD . One way of testing for evidence of selection is to test whether LATEs defined
by integrating the MTE over different intervals of supp(UD ) are equivalent. Tables
21 and 22 display the results of these tests for math and Spanish, respectively. To
perform these tests, we partition the support of UD into 25 intervals of width 0.04 and
test whether the integrated MTEs on adjacent (but not overlapping) intervals differ.
We then test that all LATEs are jointly equal to each other. The tests are conducted
by using 50 bootstrapped data sets and computing simulated p-values under the null
hypothesis of equivalent LATEs.
The Table reveals that many adjacent LATEs differ from one another and that, jointly,
the LATEs are not equal at the 10% significance level for either math or Spanish. For
example, the entry in column 1 of Table 21 indicates that

E(Y1 − Y0 |X = x, 0.04 < UD ≤ 0.08) − E(Y1 − Y0 |X = x, 0 ≤ UD ≤ 0.04) = 0.196 ,

and that the p-value that this difference is different than 0 is p = 0.000. The joint
p-value for the test of the hypothesis that all LATEs are equivalent is smaller for
Spanish than for math, p = 0.000 versus p = 0.080, and is driven by the greater
curviness in the estimated MTE for Spanish. As a result of these tests, we reject the
hypothesis of no selection on unobservables. Attendance in telesecundarias is correlated with unobserved determinants of student achievement.
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2.6.3. Explaining the Pattern of Selection
The MTEs for both math and Spanish are nonmonotonic and display evidence of
reverse selection on gains. Reverse selection on gains occurs when students who
select into the treatment (telesecundaria attendance) benefit less than students who
are untreated. In this section we discuss the source of this nonmonotonicy and what it
implies for the unobserved outcomes at both telesecundarias and traditional schools.
Following methods outlined in Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2017) we can rewrite
the Marginal Treatment Effect as

M T E(X, UD ) = X(β1 − β0 ) + k1 (UD ) − k0 (UD ) ,

(2.11)

where kj (UD ) = E[Uj |UD ] for j = 1, 2. Here k1 (UD ) can be thought of as the average
unobserved match quality between students and telesecundarias, for students with a
particular resistance to attending telesecundarias (given by UD ). Similarly, k0 (UD )
represents the unobserved match quality between students and traditional schools.
In this section, we estimate k1 (UD ) and k0 (UD ) separately to determine whether the
shape of the MTE curve is determined primarily by variability in match qualities
between students and telesecundarias or between students and traditional schools.
As shown in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) and Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2017),
k1 (UD ) and k0 (UD ) can be estimated by using a control function approach on each of
the D = 1 and D = 0 subsamples. Under Assumption (A-2)’,

E[Yj |X = x, P (Z) = p, D = j] = Xβj + Kj (p) ,
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for j = 0, 1, where

K1 (p) = E (U1 | UD ≤ p) ,

and

K0 (p) = E (U0 | UD > p) .

We can obtain k1 and k0 from K1 and K0 using the following identities in Brinch,
Mogstad, and Wiswall (2017):
∂K1 (p)
+ K1 (p)
∂p
∂K0 (p)
k0 (p) = −(1 − p)
+ K0 (p) .
∂p
k1 (p) = p

(2.12)

Figure 17 shows estimates of k1 and k0 for Math as an outcome variable. Each
estimated curve, kj for j = 0, 1, is obtained via two semiparametric regressions on
the subsample with D = j. We compute the conditional expectation of Y −Xβj given
the estimated propensity score, p, using Local Linear Regression to obtain Kj (p) and
the derivative of the conditional expectation of Y − Xβj given p via Local Quadratic
Regression to obtain

∂Kj (p)
.
∂p

kj (p) is then obtained using the identities in 2.12. The

bandwidths used are the same as in the estimation of the MTE function in Section
2.6: 0.28 for both math and Spanish.
Figure 17 demonstrates that variation in mean unobserved outcomes at telesecundarias, k1 (UD ), is dwarfed by variation in mean unobserved outcomes at traditional
schools, k0 (UD ) for students with low UD , namely those that are most likely to attend
telesecundarias. Essentially, telesecundarias and traditional schools are equally good
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for students who are most likely to attend telesecundarias. But the quality of the
match at traditional schools rapidly declines as students become less likely to attend
telesecundarias (UD increases). As UD increases still further, the match quality between students and traditional schools is remarkably constant. At the same time, the
match quality between students and telesecundarias improves as UD increases.
That k0 (UD ) is flat for nearly all students suggests little heterogeneity in the quality
of the match between students and traditional schools. There is, however, significant variation in learning at telesecundarias, reflected in the nonzero slope of k1 (UD ).
It is puzzling that students who have the highest benefit from attending telesecundarias, given by k1 (UD ) for UD close to 1, are among the least likely to attend. It
suggests that either students do not decide which school to attend based on their
expected future test scores at each school (a simple model with D = 1(Y1 − Y0 > 0)
would generate a pattern of positive selection), or that some different actor who is
not altruistic chooses the school for the student. A recent paper by Ainsworth, Dehejia, Pop-Eleches, and Urquiola (2020) finds that students in Romania could have
chosen a school with an average of 1 standard deviation higher value-added than
the one they attended, indicating that students may not be choosing schools purely
based on value-added, or that families may not be aware of each school’s value-added.

2.6.4. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we consider alternative specifications, including those designed to investigate the validity of Assumption (A-2)’.
To alleviate concerns that the instrument is directly correlated with academic outcomes, we augment equations (2.1) and (2.2) for academic outcomes with the distance
actually traveled to secondary school as an explanatory variable. If traveling long dis-
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tances causes students’ academic performance to suffer, or if student’s distance from
the secondary school they attend were correlated with unobserved determinants of
academic outcomes, then its inclusion would change our estimated treatment parameters in a significant way.
Estimates of the MTEs and treatment parameters in specifications that control for
distance traveled to secondary school are presented in Appendix B.2. We find that
including distance traveled to secondary school makes no difference for math scores
but causes a small reduction in Spanish scores. Figures B-2 and B-3 display the
estimated MTE curves for these specifications. The pattern of selection, given by
the shape of the MTE curves, as well as the point estimates of treatment parameters
presented in Table B-1 are little changed for math relative to our main specification.
Unlike in the main specification, the Spanish MTE has does not trend upward in
the noisily-estimated right tail. We estimate an ATE of 0.324 standard deviations
for math scores and 0.152 for Spanish (see Table B-2). The treatment parameters
for math are all within one standard errors of the estimates generated by our main
specification. The treatment parameters for Spanish are lower, by about two and half
standard errors, but still significant.
We also investigate whether our results may be driven by the inclusion of a large
number of students in Mexico City. Over 10% of our sample attends school in Mexico
City, a region which is unique for a variety of reasons including its wealth and high
population density. We present the estimated treatment parameters from this investigation in Table B-3 and B-4 in Appendix B.2. While the smaller sample size causes
the treatment parameters to be more noisily estimated, the tables reveal that our
results are robust to the exclusion of Mexico City from the analysis. We estimate an
ATE of 0.328 standard deviations for math value-added and 0.225 for Spanish, which
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lie within one standard deviation of the estimates generated by our main specification. The other treatment parameters also do not differ by more than one standard
deviation.

2.7. Counterfactuals
The effects of counterfactual policies can be evaluated by integrating the MTE with
respect to a probability distribution induced by the proposed policy. A baseline policy, a, is characterized by a particular distribution of the instrument, Z a . The move
from policy a to a new policy a0 corresponds to a shift in the distribution of the
instrument from FZ a to FZ a0 . This shift induces some students to attend telesecundarias who would not otherwise attend. The treatment effect for students induced
to switch attendance from traditional to telesecundarias as a result of the policy is
given P RT Ea,a0 , which is positive if these students learn more in telesecundarias than
traditional schools.
0

We consider a class of policies that expand access to telesecundarias so that Z a ≤ Z a
for all students. As we omit individuals who drop out between the sixth and seventh
grades, we will not be able to say anything about the distribution of test scores for
students who are induced to attend telesecundarias instead of dropping out as a result
of the counterfactual policy.9 Our PRTE estimates apply only to the population of
students who were already attending secondary school under the baseline policy, which
is the actual policy in 2008. In this paper we are only measuring the achievement
effects of this policy, not the enrollment effects. In rural areas, distance to school
is one of the main barriers to attending school, so a school building policy would
9

A revealed preference argument demonstrates that no students will transition from dropping
out to attendance in traditional schools as a result of the policy. A similar argument can be made to
show that no students will be induced to drop out under the proposed policy if they were attending
secondary school under the baseline policy.
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inevitably have a positive impact on enrollment as well.
We consider two counterfactual policies. The first is a hypothetical policy that reduces the relative distance to telesecundarias by 5 km for every student. It is not
a feasible policy, as it would entail moving general schools farther away for students
whose nearest telesecundaria is under 5 km. The policy counterfactual is merely analyzed as an example of the gains to a policy that can drastically raise telesecundaria
attendance.
The second counterfactual is a feasible school-building policy that constructs a telesecundaria directly adjacent to the eighteen percent of primary schools that have no
telesecundaria within a 5 km radius. This has the effect of reducing the distance
between primary schools and telesecundarias to zero for all students who formerly
had only a distant telesecundaria .
Figure 18 displays the probability distributions of UD corresponding to these two
treatment parameters. The first counterfactual induces a probability distribution
unlike any of the other treatment parameters: the distribution is considerably less
skewed than TT and has the most mass around UD = 0.30. As a result, it oversamples
individuals with some of the largest values of E[Y1 − Y0 | UD ] and produces a large
positive value for PRTE. The distribution corresponding to the second counterfactual
is closer to the distribution for TT. Relative to TT, it oversamples individuals with
low UD and undersamples those with high UD . The figure also shows the weights
corresponding to a Two-Stage Least Squares regression that uses relative distance as
an instrument for telesecundaria attendance. The IV weights correspond to neither
of the PRTE weights (nor do they correspond to the weights for ATE, TT, or TUT),
highlighting the importance of identifying the Marginal Treatment Effect for the
purposes of conducting counterfactual analysis.
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Table 23 presents the estimates of the PRTEs for both math and Spanish alongside
the IV estimate resulting from running Two-Stage Least Squares with relative distance to telesecundarias as the excluded instrument. All parameters are precisely
estimated and statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. We find
that the first policy causes a 0.360 standard deviation increase in math scores and a
0.242 standard deviation increases in Spanish scores in the seventh grade. The second
policy also causes improvements, but they are smaller, 0.223 standard deviations for
math and 0.164 standard deviations for Spanish, owing to the less dramatic nature of
the policy. The IV estimates, 0.300 for math and 0.173 for Spanish, lie in the middle
of the treatment effects of the two counterfactual policies.

2.8. Conclusion
In this paper we show that distance learning, as it has been conducted in Mexico over
the last several decades, is highly effective in raising academic achievement relative to
traditional Mexican secondary schools. We find evidence of considerable heterogeneity
in value-added in math and Spanish at telesecundarias, but that nearly all students
benefit from telesecundaria attendance. The gains are large: over a 0.3 standard
deviation increase in math scores and a 0.2 standard deviation increase in Spanish
scores over the course of a single year. Our counterfactual simulations suggest that
further expansions would yield positive academic dividends, as well. The size of the
treatment effects corresponding to these policies varies with the degree to which the
policy makes telesecundarias more accessible.
Telesecundarias have long been seen as inferior to traditional schools in Mexican media and popular discourse, in part due to the disadvantaged population they serve. We
hope that the information provided in this paper highlights the unique role telese-
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cundarias play in improving student learning and can change this perception. We
predict that future expansions of telesecundarias would raise academic achievement
in Mexico. As secondary school is an input to subsequent levels of schooling and because there are such large academic gains to a single year of telesecundaria schooling,
there are likely to be significant long-term gains to a policy that expands access to
telesecundarias.
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2.9. Tables
Table 16: Summary Statistics by Middle School Type
Cohort Size
Proportion of Cohort
Mean Math Score (7th Grade)
Mean Spanish Score (7th Grade)
Mean Math Score (6th Grade)
Mean Spanish Score (6th Grade)
Fraction Female
Mean Age (2008)
Fraction Prospera

General Technical Telesecundaria Dropped
672,349
397,050
276,395
180,853
0.44
0.26
0.18
0.12
497
498
492
500
501
483
528
532
483
457
524
527
474
454
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.47
11.9
11.9
12.2
12.8
0.16
0.18
0.66
0.33

The table displays characteristics of students who attend each of three secondary school types –
General, Technical, and Telesecundaria – as well as students who drop out. Based on information
presented in this table, we consider General and Technical schools as a single alternative for the
purposes of estimating value-added between the sixth and seventh grades.
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Table 17: Summary Statistics

Telesecundaria
Mean
S.D.
Math Score (7th grade)
Spanish Score (7th grade)
Math Score (6th grade)
Spanish Score (6th grade)
Relative Distance
Age
Siblings
Prospera
Female
Computer at Home
Rural Residence
Northern State
Books in the Home : ≤ 10
Books in the Home : 20
Books in the Home : 50
Books in the Home : ≥ 100
Mother’s Education : Primary
Mother’s Education : Middle
Mother’s Education : Secondary
Mother’s Education : Postsecondary
Income (Pesos/mo) : ≤ 2500
Income (Pesos/mo) : 2500-2999
Income (Pesos/mo) : 3000-7499
Income (Pesos/mo) : ≥ 7500

-0.042
-0.147
-0.238
-0.290
-5.078
12.177
3.697
0.652
0.506
0.126
0.674
0.051
0.707
0.178
0.067
0.047
0.760
0.187
0.040
0.013
0.579
0.263
0.116
0.041

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

Traditional
Mean
S.D.

0.984) 0.021 ( 0.980)
0.976) 0.032 ( 0.970)
0.915) 0.154 ( 0.972)
0.879) 0.182 ( 0.941)
4.128) 2.668 ( 3.495)
0.815) 11.920 ( 0.608)
2.407) 2.407 ( 1.672)
0.476) 0.161 ( 0.368)
0.500) 0.508 ( 0.500)
0.332) 0.417 ( 0.493)
0.469) 0.090 ( 0.287)
0.219) 0.296 ( 0.457)
0.455) 0.471 ( 0.499)
0.383) 0.259 ( 0.438)
0.250) 0.156 ( 0.363)
0.212) 0.114 ( 0.318)
0.427) 0.414 ( 0.493)
0.390) 0.282 ( 0.450)
0.196) 0.233 ( 0.423)
0.113) 0.071 ( 0.257)
0.494) 0.230 ( 0.421)
0.440) 0.301 ( 0.459)
0.320) 0.315 ( 0.465)
0.198) 0.153 ( 0.360)

The table displays summmary statistics on outcome variables, covariates,
and the instrument – relative distance – for students in the sample. The
statistics are broken down by the type of secondary school attended.
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Table 18: Propensity Score Model
Relative Distance
Math Score (6th Grade)
Spanish Score (6th Grade)
Age
Siblings
Female
Prospera
Family Income : Low
Family Income : Medium
Family Income : High
Mother’s Education : Middle
Mother’s Education : Secondary
Mother’s Education : Post-Secondary
Books in the Home : 20
Books in the Home : 50
Books in the Home : ≥100
Computer
Rural Residence
Northern State

Average Derivative
-0.033
-0.006
-0.011
0.016
0.004
0.003
0.033
-0.013
-0.020
-0.023
-0.018
-0.033
-0.012
-0.010
-0.017
-0.009
-0.024
0.021
-0.050

Standard Error
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.003

The table shows the average marginal effects of each variable in the propensity
score model for telesecundaria attendance. Relative distance is the instrument,
and it is computed as the difference between two distance measures. The first
is the distance from the student’s primary school to the nearest telesecundaria,
while the second is the distance from the student’s primary school to the nearest
traditional school. Relative distance is negative whenever telesecundarias are
closer. All other variables are included in the outcome models for seventh grade
test scores. The omitted category in each of Family Income, Mother’s Education,
and Books in the Home is the lowest one. Computer is a binary variable that
equals one if the student has access to a computer at home. Standard errors are
calculated via 250 bootstrap replications.
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Table 19: Estimated Treatment Effects: Math
Average Treatment Effect
Treatment on the Treated
Treatment on the Untreated

Parametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.37
(0.0177)
0.317
(0.0142)
0.383
(0.0191)

Semiparametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.342
(0.0227)
0.279
(0.0147)
0.356
(0.0267)

The table displays three treatment parameters corresponding to the effect of telesecundaria attendance on seventh grade Math scores, measured in standard deviations. The three treatment
parameters are obtained by integrating the MTE with respect to the densities displayed in Figure
16. The simulation method of Carneiro, Lokshin, and Umapathi (2017) is used to integrate the
semiparametric MTE. Standard errors are obtained through 50 bootstrap replications.

Table 20: Estimated Treatment Effects: Spanish
Average Treatment Effect
Treatment on the Treated
Treatment on the Untreated

Parametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.202
(0.0159)
0.185
(0.0129)
0.207
(0.0172)

Semiparametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.218
(0.0206)
0.168
(0.0194)
0.229
(0.0239)

The table displays three treatment parameters corresponding to the effect of telesecundaria attendance on seventh grade Spanish scores, measured in standard deviations. The three treatment
parameters are obtained by integrating the MTE with respect to the densities displayed in Figure
16. The simulation method of Carneiro, Lokshin, and Umapathi (2017) is used to integrate the
semiparametric MTE. Standard errors are obtained through 50 bootstrap replications.

Table 21: Tests for Selection on Unobservables: Math
Range of UD for LAT E j
Range of UD for LAT E j+1
Difference in LATEs
p-value
Range of UD for LAT E j
Range of UD for LAT E j+1
Difference in LATEs
p-value
Joint p-value

(0,0.04)
(0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.2) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36)
(0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.2) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36) (0.4,0.44)
0.196
0.101
0.0712
0.0373
-0.0214
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.200
0.500
(0.48,0.52) (0.56,0.6) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.8,0.84)
(0.56,0.6) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.8,0.84) (0.88,0.92)
-0.0411
-0.0305
0.0165
0.043
0.0529
0.200
0.420
0.640
0.440
0.520
0.080

(0.4,0.44)
(0.48,0.52)
-0.0456
0.120
(0.88,0.92)
(0.96,1)
0.249
0.120

The table shows the results of tests for equality of LATEs for math value-added defined by adjacent and
non-overlapping regions of the domain of UD . Given an interval [Lj , Hj ], the LATE for that interval is given
by LAT E j = E[Y1 − Y0 |X = X̄, Lj ≤ UD < Hj ], which is simply the average of the MTE between Lj and
Hj evaluated at X = x̄. p-values test the hypothesis that the difference between adjacent LATEs is equal
to zero. p-values are obtained through 50 bootstrap replications.

90

Table 22: Tests for Selection on Unobservables: Spanish
Range of UD for LAT E j
Range of UD for LAT E j+1
Difference in LATEs
p-value
Range of UD for LAT E j
Range of UD for LAT E j+1
Difference in LATEs
p-value
Joint p-value

(0,0.04)
(0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.2) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36)
(0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.2) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36) (0.4,0.44)
0.0804
0.0653
0.0504
0.0595
-0.0205
0.140
0.020
0.120
0.020
0.560
(0.48,0.52) (0.56,0.6) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.8,0.84)
(0.56,0.6) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.8,0.84) (0.88,0.92)
-0.0651
-0.0673
-0.0426
0.0612
0.123
0.100
0.020
0.200
0.300
0.10
0.000

(0.4,0.44)
(0.48,0.52)
-0.0709
0.060
(0.88,0.92)
(0.96,1)
0.462
0.00

The table shows the results of tests for equality of LATEs for Spanish value-added defined by adjacent and
non-overlapping regions of the domain of UD . Given an interval [Lj , Hj ], the LATE for that interval is given
by LAT E j = E[Y1 − Y0 |X = X̄, Lj ≤ UD < Hj ], which is simply the average of the MTE between Lj and
Hj evaluated at X = x̄. p-values test the hytpothesis that the difference between adjacent LATEs is equal
to zero. p-values are obtained through 50 bootstrap replications.

Table 23: Counterfactual Treatment Effects
Math
Spanish

PRTE1
0.360
(0.0177)
0.242
(0.0179)

PRTE2
0.223
(0.0325)
0.164
(0.0326)

IV
0.300
(0.0145)
0.173
(0.0147)

The table displays treatment parameters corresponding to two counterfactual
policies discussed in section 2.7. PRTE1 corresponds to a counterfactual policy
that reduces relative distance between telesecundarias and general secondary
schools by 5 km. PRTE2 corresponds a counterfactual policy that constructs
telesecundarias adjacent to all primary schools that do not have a telesecundaria within a 5 km radius. PRTE1 and PRTE2 are calculated using the
semiparametric MTE combined with the simulation method of Carneiro et al
(2016). Standard errors for these two treatment parameters are displayed in
parentheses and are obtained through 50 bootstrap replications. The IV estimates are obtained by a Two-Stage Least Squares regression that uses relative
distance as an instrument for telesecundaria attendance.
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2.10. Figures
Figure 12: Relative Distance to Telesecundaria

The figure plots histograms of the instrumental variable by treatment status. Control units
refer to students in traditional schools, while treated units refer to students in telesecundarias.
The instrument is the difference between two measures of distance. The first is the distance
from the student’s primary school to the nearest telesecundaria, while the second is the distance
from the student’s primary school to the nearest traditional school. Relative distance is negative
whenever telesecundarias are closer.
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Figure 13: Estimated Propensity Score by Treatment Status

The figure plots histograms of estimated propensity scores by treatment status. Control units
refer to students in traditional schools, while treated units refer to students in telesecundarias.
Propensity scores model telesecundaria attendance as a function the child’s sixth grade math
and Spanish scores, age, sex, number of siblings, the mother’s education, family income, number
of books in the home, family access to a computer, Prospera status, rural residence, residence
in a Northern state, and the relative distance between the nearest telesecundaria and nearest
traditional school. Relative distance is the difference between two measures of distance. The
first is the distance from the student’s primary school to the nearest telesecundaria, while the
second is the distance from the student’s primary school to the nearest traditional school. The
propensity score model is estimated via Probit. The figure shows that there is common support:
the distribution of estimated propensity scores for both treated and control units is the entire
[0, 1] interval.
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Figure 14: Marginal Treatment Effect: Math

The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the score on the seventh grade nationallystandardized (ENLACE) math exam. The outcome variable has been standardized and is measured in standard deviations from the mean. The outcome equations include controls for sixth
grade math and Spanish scores, the age, gender, and number of siblings of the child, family income, mother’s education, the number of books in the home, whether the family has access to
a computer at home, and dummies for rural residence and residence in a Northern state. The
school choice model includes the same controls and also includes the relative distance between
the nearest telesecundaria and nearest general secondary school as an exclusion restriction. The
school choice model is estimated using via Probit. The parametric MTE is estimated using a
two-step Least Squares method that controls for selection on unobservables. The semiparametric
MTE is estimated using Local Quadratic Regression and an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.28. The bandwidth is chosen to minimize the Integrated Mean Square Error in the
final stage of estimation. Both MTEs are evaluated at the mean value of the covariates, X = x.
Confidence intervals are computed from boostrapping using 50 draws.
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Figure 15: Marginal Treatment Effect: Spanish

The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the score on the seventh grade nationallystandardized (ENLACE) Spanish exam. The outcome variable has been standardized and is
measured in standard deviations from the mean. The outcome equations include controls for
sixth grade Math and Spanish scores, the age, gender, and number of siblings of the child, family
income, mother’s education, the number of books in the home, whether the family has access to
a computer at home, and dummies for rural residence and residence in a Northern state. The
school choice model includes the same controls and also includes the relative distance between
the nearest telesecundaria and nearest general secondary school as an exclusion restriction. The
school choice model is estimated via Probit. The parametric MTE is estimated using a two-step
Least Squares method that controls for selection on unobservables. The semiparametric MTE is
estimated using Local Quadratic Regression and an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of
0.28. The bandwidth is chosen to minimize the Integrated Mean Square Error in the final stage
of estimation. Both MTEs are evaluated at the mean value of the covariates, X = x. Confidence
intervals are computed from boostrapping using 50 draws.
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Figure 16: Treatment Parameter Weights

The figure shows the distribution of weighting functions used to construct three standard treatment parameters. The average treatment effect (ATE) integrates the MTE with respect to
the unit uniform distribution. The average effect of treatment on the treated (TT) integrates
the MTE with respect to the distribution of UD conditional on attendance in telesecundarias,
fUD ,X|D=1 (x, uD | D = 1), while the average effect of treatment on the untreated (TUT) integrates the MTE with respect to the distribution of UD conditional on attendance in traditional
schools, fUD ,X|D=0 (x, uD | D = 0).
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Figure 17: The Source of Reverse Selection

The figure plots k1 (UD ) = E[U1 | UD ] and k0 (UD ) = E[U0 | UD ] evaluated at X = x on the
vertical axis against UD on the horizontal axis. U1 is the child’s unobserved outcome in the
equation for math value-added in telesecundarias. U0 is the child’s unobserved outcome in the
equation for math value-added in traditional schools. Details on the estimation of k1 (·) and k0 (·)
are provided in section 2.6.3.
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Figure 18: Counterfactual Treatment Parameter Weights

The figure shows the distribution of weighting functions used to construct estimates of PolicyRelevant Treatment Effects (PRTEs) for two policies discussed in section 2.7 as well as the
weights induced by Two-Stage Least Squares which uses relative distance as an instrument for
telesecundaria attendance. PRTE1 corresponds to the weights induced by a counterfactual policy
which reduces relative distance between telesecundarias and traditional secondary schools by
5 km. PRTE2 corresponds to the weights induced by a counterfactual policy that constructs
telesecundarias adjacent to all primary schools that do not have a telesecundaria within a 5 km
radius.
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Figure 19: Histogram of Propensity Scores under Counterfactual Policies

The figure plots histograms of the probability of attending a telesecundaria under the current
policy (2008) as well as two counterfactual policies. Counterfactual 1 reduces relative distance
between telesecundarias and general secondary schools by 5 km. Counterfactual 2 is a schoolbuilding policy that constructs telesecundarias adjacent to all primary schools that do not have
a telesecundaria within a 5 km radius. The counterfactual policies are discussed in greater detail
in section 2.7.
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APPENDIX
A. Appendix - Chapter 1
A.1. Histograms of Raw Test Scores
Figure A-1: Grade 7 Test Score Distribution

Figure A-2: Grade 6 Test Score Distribution

A.2. Factor Analysis for Effort Questions
I use factor analysis to estimate the latent effort variable. I am assuming that there
is a true unobserved latent effort variable, and that the five questions that I observe
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are all affected by the latent variable. Formalizing this, I assume that the unobserved
M
M
latent effort variable êM
i is connected to the five measures in the data (ei1 , ..., ei5 ) in

the following way,

M
eM
i1 = γ1 êi + ui1

..
.
M
eM
i5 = γ5 êi + ui5

First, I compute the correlation matrix of the five measures in the data. Because
four of the measures are ordinal variables, I compute a polychoric correlation matrix.
This follows the practice in the literature, and the main assumption is that the ordinal
variables have an underlying joint continuous distribution. The polychoric correlation
matrix for my five measures of effort is calculated to be:
Table A-1: Polychoric Correlation Matrix for Effort Variables
Pay Attention
Participate
Miss School
Skip Class
Study Hours

Pay Attention
1.00
0.43
-0.23
-0.24
0.28

Participate

Miss School

Skip Class

Study Hours

1.00
-0.13
-0.14
0.20

1.00
0.25
-0.11

1.00
-0.08

1.00

The signs of the correlations are as would be expected, with paying attention in class,
participating in class and the number of hours studied per day all positively correlated
with each other, and negatively correlated with missing school and skipping class.
To compute the factor loadings and get an estimate for the latent effort variable I
use the Principal Axis method. This is an iterative procedure, and iterates until the
communalities of each of the measures do not vary by iteration. Communalities are
defined as the component of the variance of each of the measures that are shared, and
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therefore can be attributed to the latent factor. The initial guess of the communality
of a given variable comes from the R2 of the regression using that variable as the
independent variable, and the other four measures as the dependent variables. These
initial guesses replace the diagonal elements of the correlation matrix. Then, an
eigendecomposition is done of this updated correlation matrix. Using the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors, new communalities can be computed. This is repeated, until the
communalities stabilize. After convergence, the loadings are extracting using the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the final matrix.
The loadings for each of the effort variables are,
Table A-2: Loading Factors for the Effort Variables
Loadings
Variables
PayAttention
0.77
Participate
0.53
-0.34
MissSchool
SkipClass
-0.34
StudyHours
0.35
To get an estimate of the latent effort variable êM
i for each student i, I multiply their
effort measures by the associated loading factor.

M
M
êM
i = l1 ∗ ei1 + ... + l5 ∗ ei5

The result is a continuous effort variable for each student, that has greater variance
than any of the individual measures used to compute it. Figure 3 shows a histogram
of the final effort measures.

A.3. Estimation Strategy Details
1. Guess parameters. There are 51 parameters in this version of the model:
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• 15 coefficients for each of the achievement value added equations
• 3 parameters in the variance-covariance matrix for the value added equations
• 17 coefficients in the utility equation
• 1 parameters for the standard deviation of the effort distribution
2. For each student, compute their individual likelihood given the guessed parameters and data:
• Compute the effort implied by the model (for all options in the student’s
choice set) using Equation 1.2.
• Compute expected math and Spanish scores using effort and Equation 1.1
(without the error terms since it is an expectation).
• For students who enrolled in Grade 7, compute the achievement and effort
probabilities. (For students who did not enroll, assign a value of 1 to these
probabilities.)
• For all students, compute the multinomial logit probability given in Equation 1.4.
• Take the product of the three probabilities.
3. Take the log of each individual likelihood, and sum them. Maximize this value
with respect to all of these parameters.
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A.4. Creating Estimation Sample
For students to be in my main estimation sample, I require data on their Grade 6
and 7 ENLACE tests, as well as survey responses from the student and their parent
in Grade 7. I am using the survey responses in Grade 7, since I need to know if the
students are working or not in that year.
Unfortunately, this sample excludes any students who dropped out between Grade 6
and Grade 7, and I want to model this behavior as well. To incorporate these students
into the sample, I randomly select students who wrote the ENLACE tests in Grade
6, have student and parent surveys from Grade 6, and dropped out after Grade 6 and
include them in my estimation sample. The number of students I include is chosen so
that the dropout ratio is the same as in the full dataset. In doing this, I am assuming
that some of the background information from the survey, such as parental education,
are constant over these two years.

A.5. Calculating the Standard Errors
Standard errors are calculated using a sandwich-type covariance matrix (Yuan et al.,
2014). Define the log likelihood for student i given parameters Ω as Li (Ω). As detailed
in the estimation section, I am able to calculate such probabilities using the data and
parameters. To estimate the covariance matrix with a sample of n students, I use the
following formula:
−1
−1
ˆ = Â B̂ Â
Cov
n
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(A-1)

where
n

1 X ∂ 2 Li (Ω̂)
n i=1 ∂ Ω̂∂ Ω̂0
"
#"
#0
n
∂Li (Ω̂)
1 X ∂Li (Ω̂)
B̂ =
n i=1
∂ Ω̂
∂ Ω̂
Â = −

The matrix Â is an estimation for the Hessian, and the matrix B̂ is an estimation of
the outer product of the gradient. I calculate the gradient and the Hessian numerically in R, using the functions grad() and hessian(). To get the final standard errors,
I take the square root of the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix.

A.6. Wage Regressions
The data used to estimate the wage regressions comes from the Mexico 2010 Census,
and can be accessed through the IPUMS site: https://international.ipums.org/
international-action/variables/search. The variables that are downloaded are:
• Age of subject (MX2010A AGE)
• Whether or not the subject currently attends school (MX2010A SCHOOL)
• Income of individual for the last month (MX2010A INCOME)
• Household’s income from work (MX2010A INCHOME)
• Number of hours worked by individual in the last week (MX2010A HRSWORK)
• Educational attainment level of individual in number of years
(MX2010A EDATTAIN)
• Educational attainment level of mother in number of years
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MX2010A EDATTAIN MOM)
• Educational attainment level of father in number of years
(MX2010A EDATTAIN POP)
• Gender (MX2010A SEX)
• Employment status (MX2010A EMPSTAT)
• Position at work (MX2010A CLASSWK)
• State code (GEO1 MX2010)
• Municipality code (GEO2 MX2010)
• Urban-rural status (URBAN)
In order to compute the regressions, we recode several new variables from the ones
listed above:
• INCOME PER HOUR (Created by dividing income last month by 4 times
the number of hours worked last week)
• familyworker (Dummy for whether the individual is an unpaid family worker)
• mom edattain missing (Created from MX2010A EDATTAIN MOM variable;
1 = mom’s educational attainment is missing, 0 = mom’s educational attainment is not missing)
• dad edattain missing (Created from MX2010A EDATTAIN POP variable;
1 = dad’s educational attainment is missing, 0 = dad’s educational attainment
is not missing)
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• north dummy (Dummy for whether municipality is in the North or South
region of Mexico ; 1 = North, 0 = South)
The next steps are to clean and filter the data:
1. Exclude individuals with an undefined age (include only MX2010A AGE !=
999)
2. Exclude individuals with undefined school attendance status (include only
MX2010A SCHOOL == 1 |MX2010A SCHOOL == 2)
3. Assign 0 to missing or unknown values for monthly personal income
(MX2010A INCOME), monthly family income (MX2010A INCHOME), and
hours worked in the last week (MX2010A HRSWORK)
4. Create Income Per Hour variable by dividing MX2010A INCOME (monthly
income) by 4 times MX2010A HRSWORK (hours worked in the last week) and
assign infinite and undefined values to 0
5. Reassign educational attainment variables (MX2010A EDATTAIN,
MX2010 EDATTAIN MOM, MX2010A EDATTAIN POP) values with continuous values
6. Create mom edattain missing and dad edattain missing variables by assigning
a 1 for these variables if the MX2010A EDATTAIN MOM and
MX2010A EDATTAIN POP are missing or unknown, respectively, and a 0 if
not
7. Include only individuals with educational attainment levels equal to or below 13
(MX2010A EDATTAIN <= 13) in order to exclude students who have finished
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high school
8. Create a dummy variable (mun dummy) that indicates whether (1) or not (0)
the municipality the individual is in also contains a city with at population of
at least 100,000 (merged with CityCoordinates withMunicipalities file)
9. Create a north/south dummy (north dummy) that indicates whether the municipality is in the northern (1) or southern (0) region of Mexico
10. Filter by age to only include inviduals between the age of 12 and 20 inclusive
(MX2010A AGE <= 20 & MX2010A AGE >= 12)
11. Create cutoffs for INCOME PER HOUR, MX2010A HRSWORK,
MX2010A INCHOME and exclude entries for each variable with values above
the 99th quantile
12. Create a yeswork variable where yeswork = 1 if one of the following criteria are
met:
• MX2010A EMPSTAT == 10
• MX2010A HRSWORK != 0
• MX2010A INCOME != 0
• MX2010A CLASSWK == 1
• MX2010A CLASSWK == 2
• MX2010A CLASSWK == 3
• MX2010A CLASSWK == 4
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• MX2010A CLASSWK == 5
• MX2010A CLASSWK == 6
and MX2010A HRSWORK >= 5 and INCOME PER HOUR >0
13. Create family net income (netincome) variable by subtracting individual’s income from their entire family’s income (which includes the individual’s income):
MX2010A INCHOME - MX2010A INCOME
14. Then create dummies for family income where
• family income1 includes netincome <1500
• family income2 includes 1500 <= netincome <3000
• family income3 includes 3000 <= netincome <7500
• family income4 includes 7500 <= netincome <15000
• family income5 includes 15000 <= netincome <30000
• family income6 includes netincome >= 30000
15. Create separate nonzero data data set by filtering yeswork ==1
16. Separate into two data sets based on gender
Wage regressions are estimated on the two data sets separately, using a Heckman
selection model. The first step is to run a probit model on the probability of working.
The full dataset is used to estimate this probit. The wage regressors include: age,
school attendance, educational attainment, parental educational attainment, parents
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are missing, urban-rural dummies, north-south dummies, and municipality dummies.
In addition, the following variables are assumed to influence selection into working,
but not the wage offers, and are included as exclusion restrictions: family income,
home electricity, home piped water, home internet and home computer.
Using the results from the probit, it is possible to create control functions for each
student. These are included as a regressor in the next step of the estimation process,
which is a fixed effect linear regression model with hourly wages as the independent
variable, and the regressors listed in the probit (without the exclusion restriction
variables). The fixed effects in the model are the municipality fixed effects, which
allow for great geographic heterogeneity. This regression is estimated using the subset
of students who report working and earning a positive wage.
Results for the wage regressions are shown in Table A-3.
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Figure A-3: Wage Regression Results: Hourly Wages
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Figure A-4: Wage Regression Results: Hours Worked per Week
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B. Appendix - Chapter 2
B.1. Letting the MTE vary by observables
Identification of the Marginal Treatment Effect does not require that X be exogenous.
As we explain in Section 2.6, assuming that X is exogenous has several practical
advantages, although it imposes a cost as well, that the slope of M T E(X, UD ) in UD
does not depend on X. There are a number of ways to investigate this assumption.
In this section, we divide the sample into groups based on values of X and estimate
M T E(X, UD ) separately for each subsample.
We first partition the sample into two subsamples on the basis of gender. For each
subsample, we estimate M T E(X, UD ) semiparametrically as in the main text, conditioning on all the variables in X apart from gender. This procedure generates two
MTE functions, one for boys and another for girls, that we present side-by-side in
Figure B-1. The figure displays the average difference in math scores between Telesecondary and traditional schooling on the vertical axis and the latent variable denoting
resistance to treatment, UD , on the horizontal axis. Both MTEs are mostly upwardsloping, but there is greater variability among boys than girls. For boys with the
lowest values of UD as well as the very highest values, the MTE has a much steeper
slope than for girls. The MTE is not precisely estimated for the highest values of UD ,
so it is difficult to say whether this difference is significant, although it does seem
to be significant for lower values of UD . This suggests that the pattern of reverse
selection is driven much more by heterogeneity in schooling outcomes among boys
than among girls.
We are also considering partitioning the sample by whether students had below or
above median test scores prior to attending secondary school as well as for rural vs
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nonrural residence.
Figure B-1: Gender-Specific MTEs

The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the score on the seventh grade nationallystandardized (ENLACE) math exam. The outcome variable has been standardized and is measured in standard deviations from the mean. The outcome equations include controls for sixth
grade Math and Spanish scores, the age, and number of siblings of the child, family income,
mother’s education, the number of books in the home, whether the family has access to a computer at home, dummies for rural residence and residence in a Northern state, and the distance
actually traveled to secondary school. The school choice model includes the same controls and also
includes the relative distance between the nearest Telesecondary and nearest general secondary
school as an exclusion restriction. The sample is divided into subsamples by gender before estimating the MTE using using Local Quadratic Regression and an Epanechnikov kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.28, the same as in the figures in the main text. Both MTEs are evaluated at the
mean value of the covariates, X = x. Confidence intervals are computed from boostrapping using
50 draws.
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B.2. Additional Tables and Figures
Figure B-2: Controlling for Distance Traveled: Math

The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the score on the seventh grade nationallystandardized (ENLACE) math exam. The outcome variable has been standardized and is measured in standard deviations from the mean. The outcome equations include controls for sixth
grade Math and Spanish scores, the age, gender, and number of siblings of the child, family
income, mother’s education, the number of books in the home, whether the family has access
to a computer at home, dummies for rural residence and residence in a Northern state, and
the distance actually traveled to secondary school. The school choice model includes the same
controls and also includes the relative distance between the nearest Telesecondary and nearest
general secondary school as an exclusion restriction. The school choice model is estimated via
Probit. The parametric MTE is estimated using a two-step Least Squares method that controls
for selection on unobservables. The semiparametric MTE is estimated using Local Quadratic
Regression and an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.28. The bandwidth is chosen to
minimize the Integrated Mean Square Error in the final stage of estimation. Both MTEs are
evaluated at the mean value of the covariates, X = x. Confidence intervals are computed from
boostrapping using 50 draws.
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Figure B-3: Marginal Treatment Effect Controlling for Distance Traveled: Spanish

The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the score on the seventh grade nationallystandardized (ENLACE) Spanish exam. The outcome variable has been standardized and is
measured in standard deviations from the mean. The outcome equations include controls for
sixth grade Math and Spanish scores, the age, gender, and number of siblings of the child, family
income, mother’s education, the number of books in the home, whether the family has access
to a computer at home, dummies for rural residence and residence in a Northern state, and
the distance actually traveled to secondary school. The school choice model includes the same
controls and also includes the relative distance between the nearest Telesecondary and nearest
general secondary school as an exclusion restriction. The school choice model is estimated via
Probit. The parametric MTE is estimated using a two-step Least Squares method that controls
for selection on unobservables. The semiparametric MTE is estimated using Local Quadratic
Regression and an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.28. The bandwidth is chosen to
minimize the Integrated Mean Square Error in the final stage of estimation. Both MTEs are
evaluated at the mean value of the covariates, X = x. Confidence intervals are computed from
boostrapping using 50 draws.
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Table B-1: Estimated Treatment Effects Controlling for Distance Traveled: Math
Average Treatment Effect
Treatment on the Treated
Treatment on the Untreated

Parametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.35
(0.0191)
0.304
(0.0177)
0.358
(0.02)

Semiparametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.324
(0.0298)
0.266
(0.0206)
0.338
(0.0336)

The table displays three treatment parameters corresponding to the effect of Telesecondary attendance on seventh grade math scores, measured in standard deviations. It differs from Table 19 in the
main text in that this specification conditions on the distance actually traveled to secondary school
in the outcome equations. The three treatment parameters are obtained by integrating the MTE
with respect to the densities displayed in Figure 16. The simulation method of Carneiro, Lokshin,
and Umapathi (2017) is used to integrate the semiparametric MTE. Standard errors are obtained
through 50 bootstrap replications.

Table B-2: Estimated Treatment Effects Controlling for Distance Traveled: Spanish
Average Treatment Effect
Treatment on the Treated
Treatment on the Untreated

Parametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.21
(0.0222)
0.19
(0.0191)
0.214
(0.0233)

Semiparametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.152
(0.0262)
0.137
(0.0192)
0.156
(0.0302)

The table displays three treatment parameters corresponding to the effect of Telesecondary attendance on seventh grade Spanish scores, measured in standard deviations. It differs from Table 20
in the main text in that this specification conditions on the distance actually traveled to secondary
school in the outcome equations. The three treatment parameters are obtained by integrating the
MTE with respect to the densities displayed in Figure 16. The simulation method of Carneiro,
Lokshin, and Umapathi (2017) is used to integrate the semiparametric MTE. Standard errors are
obtained through 50 bootstrap replications.

Table B-3: Estimated Treatment Effects Omitting Mexico City: Math
Average Treatment Effect
Treatment on the Treated
Treatment on the Untreated

Parametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.362
(0.0173)
0.308
(0.0146)
0.377
(0.0185)

Semiparametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.328
(0.0209)
0.283
(0.0193)
0.34
(0.0248)

The table displays three treatment parameters corresponding to the effect of Telesecondary attendance on seventh grade math scores, measured in standard deviations. It differs from Table 19 in
the main text in that this specification omits students who attend secondary school in Mexico City.
The three treatment parameters are obtained by integrating the MTE with respect to the densities
displayed in Figure 16. The simulation method of Carneiro, Lokshin, and Umapathi (2017) is used to
integrate the semiparametric MTE. Standard errors are obtained through 50 bootstrap replications.
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Table B-4: Estimated Treatment Effects omitting Mexico City: Spanish
Average Treatment Effect
Treatment on the Treated
Treatment on the Untreated

Parametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.198
(0.0176)
0.177
(0.0161)
0.203
(0.0186)

Semiparametric
Estimate Standard Error
0.225
(0.0269)
0.176
(0.0215)
0.238
(0.031)

The table displays three treatment parameters corresponding to the effect of Telesecondary attendance on seventh grade Spanish scores, measured in standard deviations. It differs from Table 19 in
the main text in that this specification omits students who attend secondary school in Mexico City.
The three treatment parameters are obtained by integrating the MTE with respect to the densities
displayed in Figure 16. The simulation method of Carneiro, Lokshin, and Umapathi (2017) is used to
integrate the semiparametric MTE. Standard errors are obtained through 50 bootstrap replications.
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